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1 
Rescuing the Invention from the Cult of the Claim 
Oskar Liivak∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Right now law professors around the country are introducing a 
fresh crop of students to the world of patent law.  Early on we lecture 
about the importance of patent claims, pointing out that they are 
used to decide every important issue in patent law.
1
  Most importantly 
we tell our students that the claims define a patent’s potent exclusive 
rights.  “Claims are the most important part of the modern patent 
document.”
2
  As stated by Judge Giles Rich, “[T]he name of the game 
is the claim.”
3
 
Every once in a while an observant, bright-eyed student raises 
her hand and questions this claim-centric view.  She begins by noting 
that patent law has been understood as “entirely statutory”
4
 from be-
 
 ∗ Associate Professor of Law, Cornell University Law School.  This Article has 
benefitted from presentations at the 2010 Intellectual Property Scholars Conference 
held at the UC Berkeley School of Law.  I especially thank Dan Burk, Kevin Collins, 
Christopher Cotropia, James Dabney, Rebecca Eisenberg, Robin Feldman, Paul 
Heald, Tim Holbrook, Mark Lemley, and Bradley Wendel for helpful comments and 
discussion.  I also want to thank my student James Nault for invaluable help.  An ear-
lier draft benefitted from presentations at the 3rd  Annual Junior Scholars in IP 
Workshop held at Michigan State University College of Law and the 2009 Intellectual 
Property Scholars Conference. 
 1 Mark Lemley, The Changing Meaning of Patent Claim Terms, 104 MICH. L. REV. 
105, 105 (2005) (“The claims of a patent are central to virtually every aspect of patent 
law.  The claims define the scope of the invention, and their meaning therefore de-
termines both whether a defendant’s product infringes a patent and whether the pa-
tent is valid.”).  
 2 John F. Duffy, On Improving the Legal Process of Claim Interpretation: Administrative 
Alternatives, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 109, 109 (2000). 
 3 Giles S. Rich, Extent of Protection and Interpretation of Claims—American Perspec-
tives, 21 INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 497, 499 (1990). 
 4 Howard T. Markey, Why Not the Statute?, 65 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 331, 331 (1983).  
Of course Judge Markey noted that there is “some judicial maneuvering within the 
interstices of the statute.”  Id.  But he emphasized that 
[o]ur concern here is with plain, simple disregard of the statute—
evidenced in the promulgation of some words and phrases that muddy 
the decisional waters and other words and phrases that render the law 
as written by congress a nullity.  In sum, when it comes to patent cases, 
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fore the United States was even founded.
5
  She then points to the sta-
tute and its novelty requirement.  It forbids a patent if “the invention 
was known” before not if the claimed subject matter was known be-
fore.
6
  And similarly, for the important disclosure requirements, the 
patent applicant must provide a “written description of the invention” 
and must “enable [others] to make and use [the invention].”
7
  Most 
importantly, she then points out that the statute grants exclusive 
rights in the “patented invention,” not the claimed subject matter.
8
  
She innocently asks how the claims can be so central in patent law 
when the statute refers instead to the invention.  Why is the invention 
not the central concept in patent law? 
The eyes of the class return to the lectern.  Our pulse quickens 
(hopefully not visibly) and we recall our rehearsed script.
9
  We com-
pliment the student on her close statutory reading but we quickly add 
(hopefully not condescendingly) that the modern patent system is 
now a peripheral claiming system and within that system the inven-
tion is defined by the claimed subject matter.  In other words, though 
the statute refers to the invention, those statutory references should 
be read as references to the claims.  As summarized nicely by Jeffrey 
Lefstin, “In modern parlance, ‘the claim,’ ‘the invention,’ and the 
‘the patent’ are essentially synonymous.”
10
  There is no discrepancy 
because focusing on the claims is focusing on the invention.  The in-
vention is nothing more than a short-hand reference for the claimed 
subject matter.  To back our position we quote the Supreme Court as 
stating that “[u]nder the statute it is the claims of the patent which 
 
the statute is the law—and court opinions containing language and 
concepts contrary to the statute are unlawful. 
Id. 
 5 See Donaldson v. Beckett (1774) 1 Eng. Rep. 837; Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 
Pet.) 591 (1834). 
 6 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).  And recently Congress passed the first major overhaul 
of the patent laws since 1952.  The new § 102 changed slightly shifting the focus from 
the “invention” to the “claimed invention.”  See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 
Pub. L. No. 112-29; 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C.).  That change 
does not impact the analysis or arguments in this article.  The claimed invention is 
just a subset of the invention.  Interestingly, note that 35 U.S.C. § 103 does not place 
the invention at the center of its test.  It looks instead to the obviousness of the dif-
ference between “the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art.”  Id.     
§ 103(a). 
 7 Id. § 112. 
 8 Id. § 271. 
 9 I thank James Dabney for describing this as a script that the patent bar is 
taught to follow. 
 10 Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Formal Structure of Patent Law and the Limits of Enablement, 
23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1141, 1145 (2008). 
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define the invention.”
11
  And we point to the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit, which has further elaborated this “bedrock principle 
of patent law that the claims of a patent define the invention to which 
the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.”
12
  From the Supreme 
Court on down, it is understood that the claims are legal devices to 
delineate “the patentee’s right to exclude,”
13
 and the invention is just 
a short hand reference for those legal boundaries.  We explain that 
the statutory references to “the invention” can be viewed as a redun-
dant “anachron[ism]” that in our modern system we could just as well 
replace with the claims.
14
  In fact we should not think of the claims as 
“[w]hat the inventors invented,” but rather as just directly delineating 
“the right to exclude.”15   
Having forcefully delivered the orthodox line and to underscore 
its correctness, we quickly return to the lecture and the rest of patent 
law.  A clear unspoken message has been sent: there is nothing inter-
esting to explore here.  To talk about “the invention” instead of the 
claims is an “old-fashioned” way to think about patent law.
16
  When 
the spark of that student’s curiosity fades and when this orthodoxy is 
accepted, the student unknowingly and unfortunately becomes the 
latest member indoctrinated into modern patent law’s cult of the 
claim. 
At first as the student continues her study of patent law, a fairly 
coherent, formal framework emerges.
17
  The claim-centric system 
seems to fit with patent law’s ongoing drive towards “precision” and 
 
 11 Altoona Publix Theatres, Inc. v. Am. Tri-Ergon Corp., 294 U.S. 477, 487 
(1935); see also Aro Mfg., Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 339 
(1961); McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 424 (1891). 
 12 Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 
1115 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see also Chris Cotropia, What is the Invention? (Aug. 29, 2011) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1918841.  
 13 Giles S. Rich, Foreword to F. SCOTT KIEFF ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW, at iii, 
v–vi (4th ed. 2008). 
 14 Id. at v. 
 15 Id. at v–vi.  To foreshadow the criticism of this framework that follows below, 
note that this vision for the patent system forces a very strained interpretation of the 
invention.  The plain meaning of the invention is the thing or things invented.  Yet 
in the modern understanding of patent law the invention is now just a term of art 
decoupled from what was actually invented.  
 16 Transcript of Oral Argument at 52–53, KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 
398 (2007) (No. 04-1350). 
 17 See generally Lefstin, supra note 10 (describing the formal structure of the mod-
ern claim-centric patent system). 
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“accuracy.”
18
  The 1952 Patent Act itself was written expressly in hopes 
of producing “a strong and reliable patent system.”
19
  And even the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the court that hears all pa-
tent appeals, was itself created with the purpose of reducing “confu-
sion and uncertainty” in patent law.
20
 
Yet on closer inspection, long after that basic bedrock principle 
of the cult has deeply cemented itself in our understanding, serious 
cracks and blemishes appear.  Modern patent law has been incapable 
of articulating a coherent view for two critically important doctrinal 
areas: claim interpretation and the disclosure requirements.  Claim 
interpretation has been described as the “festering sore of uncertain-
ty in Federal Circuit patent jurisprudence,”
21
 while the disclosure re-
quirements are considered “a welter of confused and confusing 
precedent that not only defies restatement, but also renders analysis 
and synthesis distinctly unmanageable.”
22
 
So what is happening?  This Article argues that these cracks and 
blemishes result from building the patent system on a faulty founda-
tion. It argues that the cult, its vision for patent law, and its “bedrock 
principle” are based on an incorrect interpretation of the invention.  
Yet, a substantive discussion of the invention as a statutory concept is 
nowhere to be found in modern patent doctrine or scholarship.
23
  
 
 18 Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 573 (1876); see also Karl B. Lutz, Evolution of the 
Claims of U.S. Patents, 20 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 457, 464 (1938). 
 19 Donald W. Banner, Foreword to NONOBVIOUSNESS—THE ULTIMATE CONDITION 
OF PATENTABILITY, at v, v (John F. Witherspoon ed., 1980). 
 20 R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empiri-
cal Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1108 (2003).  “Indeed, as 
a response to widespread dissatisfaction due to confusion and uncertainty under the 
decentralized administration of the patent law, the Federal Circuit was created to 
play this very role.”  Id. 
 21 Harold C. Wegner, Arlington Indus. v. Bridgeport Fittings: The 20 Year Claim 
Construction Debate, IP FRONTLINE (Jan. 24, 2011), http://www.ipfrontline.com/ 
depts/article.aspx?id=24829&deptid=7. 
 22 Robert L. Harmon, Must a Patent Describe an Accused Infringement?, 85 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 153, 154 (2003). 
 23 The one recent exception is Cotropia, supra note 12.  Earlier, the only article 
was written by Paul Janicke, but to a large extent that article essentially detailed an 
interpretation of the invention similar to the cult.  See Paul Janicke, The Varied Mean-
ings of “Invention” in Patent Practice: Different Meanings in Different Situations, in 4 
PATENT LAW PERSPECTIVES, at App. 1 (Donald R. Dunner et al., eds., 1970).  Recent 
work by Tun-Jen Chiang uses the term invention, but he ultimately concludes that 
there can be no right definition of the invention, and therefore, it should just be a 
vehicle for a realist judge to impose his or her policy choices.  Tun-Jen Chiang, The 
Levels of Abstraction Problem in Patent Law, 105 NW. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (on file 
with author).  This Article does not agree with that usage, nor is Chiang’s usage real-
ly an attempt to understand the statutory usage of the invention.   
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Consult any modern treatise or casebook and you will not find an in 
depth discussion.
24
  Modern patent law just assumes that the cult’s 
view is correct and that the topic needs no further thought.  It is time 
to rekindle the spark of that student’s question, time to question the 
cult of the claim, and time to rethink the invention.  This Article ar-
gues that the cult’s vision of the invention and its concomitant 
framework for patent law are inconsistent not only with the statute 
but they lead us to a patent system that grants exclusive rights that 
exceed patent law’s constitutionally mandated limits. 
This Article argues that the invention is not simply a shorthand 
reference for the claimed subject matter as the cult believes.  Claims 
are not written to directly delineate a patent’s exclusionary rights.  
Correctly interpreted, the invention is a substantive, technical con-
cept.  The invention is the inventor’s own solution to some technical 
problem for which the inventor seeks a patent.  In other words, the 
invention is what the inventor actually invented and disclosed in the 
patent application.  In patent jargon, the invention is the set of em-
bodiments conceived and disclosed by the inventor in enough detail 
that they can be reduced to practice.  Claims still play an important 
part in this patent system, but they function as tools that aid in the 
process of determining the invention.  Claims are written to help de-
lineate the contours of the technical invention described in the pa-
tent.  Those claims then indirectly lead to exclusive rights because 
they help courts determine what constitutes the patentable invention.  
This Article will lay out the evidence in support of this substantive in-
terpretation of the invention and the benefits that accrue from em-
ploying it to structure our patent system. 
This Article argues that there are a number of reasons for first 
exploring and then adopting this substantive, technical vision of the 
invention.  First, when we explore the invention, it becomes clear that 
the cult’s trivial vision of the invention cannot be correct.  The cult 
requires a strained reading of the statute and it leads to patents 
whose scope exceeds constitutional limitations.  In contrast, the subs-
tantive vision is consistent with the statute, and it respects the limits 
imposed on patent law by the Constitution.  Second, this substantive 
vision of the invention provides a comprehensive way to interpret the 
disclosure requirements that can resolve the ongoing debates pre-
venting consensus.  With the substantive view, the disclosure re-
quirements simply ask the inventor to document his invention.  Last-
 
 24 See, e.g., JANICE MUELLER, PATENT LAW 67 (3d ed. 2009)(giving the standard de-
finition of the invention under the cult but providing no further support for that de-
finition).   
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ly, the substantive vision recasts the purpose of the claims, which re-
solves the debates over claim interpretation.  For the cult, claims are 
direct delineations of a patent’s right to exclude and they are inter-
preted accordingly.  The specification only bears a tangential relation-
ship to claim interpretation.  In contrast, the substantive view views 
the claims as written to highlight the invention disclosed in the speci-
fication.  In other words, claims are written to satisfy the statutory re-
quirement to “particularly point[] out and distinctly claim[] the sub-
ject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.”
25
  And 
under the substantive view, claims should be interpreted accordingly.  
The substantive vision gives claims critically important contextual 
meaning by tying the purpose of the claims to the overall purpose of 
the specification.  The claims are not abstract legal boundaries, but 
rather, they “particularly point[] out and distinctly claim[]” the ac-
tual substantive invention described by the specification.
26
  This con-
text should add uniformity and stability to the process of claim inter-
pretation. 
The rest of this Article examines these issues in more detail.  Fol-
lowing this introduction, Part II outlines the cult of the claim and its 
framework for patent law.  Then Part III introduces the substantive 
view of the invention and the evidence supporting it.  This Part shows 
how the originality requirement violated by the cult is inherently res-
pected by this substantive vision of the invention.  Part IV highlights 
how current patent case law is best understood as a mix of the trivial 
and substantive visions of the invention.  It emphasizes how the subs-
tantive vision of the invention can recast the current debates over 
claim interpretation and the disclosure requirements.  It also shows 
how substantive invention changes the role of claims and how that 
change should improve stability and precision in claim interpreta-
tion.  Part V explores the history of the invention and explains how 
this central term was emptied of substantive content.  Part VI outlines 
further areas of study regarding substantive invention and patent law. 
II. THE CULT OF THE CLAIM AND ITS VISION FOR PATENT LAW 
This Part describes the trivial view of the invention that is at the 
heart of the cult of the claim.  In this view, the invention is just a 
shorthand reference for the claimed subject matter.  This Part de-
scribes the statutory and precedential basis for this view, and it then 
 
 25 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 2 (2006). 
 26 Id. 
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describes the overall patent system that flows from rigorously apply-
ing this view of the invention to the patent statute. 
A. The Cult and Its Bedrock Principle 
In the cult, the statutory starting point for understanding patent 
law is 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 2.  It requires a patent applicant to conclude 
the specification, the main portion of the patent application, “with 
one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming 
the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.”
27
  
Referring to this provision, the Supreme Court has stated that 
“[u]nder the statute, it is the claims of the patent which define the 
invention.”
28
  Other Supreme Court cases similarly emphasize that 
“the claims made in the patent are the sole measure of the grant.”
29
  
And that “[t]he claim is the measure of [the patentee’s] right to re-
lief.”
30
  From these statements, a long line of Federal Circuit cases 
state the ‘“bedrock principle’ of patent law that ‘the claims of a pa-
tent define the invention to which the patentee is entitled the right to 
exclude.’”
31
  Because the claims define the invention, the invention 
itself has no substantive existence other than as a shorthand for the 
subject matter that a patentee can claim. 
Judge Giles Rich, recounting the drafting of the 1952 Patent Act, 
stated that “[o]ne apparent thought . . . was to stop talking about 
whether a thing is or is not an ‘invention,’ to take anything presented 
as an invention, and then to determine its patentability according to a 
standard which Congress was to declare [in the 1952 Act].”
32
  In 
short, “there is always an invention—and the issue is its patentability.”
33
  
In essence, your invention is whatever you claim it to be.
34
 
 
 27 Id. 
 28 Altoona Publix Theatres, Inc. v. Am. Tri-Ergon Corp., 294 U.S. 477, 487 
(1935). 
 29 Aro Mfg., Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 339 (1961). 
 30 McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 424 (1891). 
 31 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting Inno-
va/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed. 
Cir. 2004)); see also Cotropia, supra note 12. 
 32 Giles S. Rich, The Vague Concept of “Invention” as Replaced by Section 103 of the 
1952 Patent Act, in NONOBVIOUSNESS, supra note 19, at 1:401, 1:407. 
 33 Giles S. Rich, Escaping the Tyranny of Words—Is Evolution of Legal Thinking 
Impossible, in NONOBVIOUSNESS, supra note 19, at 3:301, 3:306. 
 34 See Janice M. Mueller, The Evolving Application of the Written Description Require-
ment to Biotechnological Inventions, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 615, 638 (1998) (“By claim-
ing human insulin-encoding cDNA at the time they filed the application for the ‘525 
patent, UC conveyed to the art that the human cDNA was something it had invented.  
This is all that written description requires.”).  
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In this view, claims are “the sole measure of the invention,”
35
 and 
they form the “cornerstone” of the modern patent system.
36
  In this 
system, as argued by Judge Giles Rich, “the sole function of [a] patent 
claim[]” is “to determine the scope of the right to exclude.”
37
  The 
claims in a patent application are the subject matter over which the 
applicant is requesting exclusive rights in exchange for their disclo-
sure.  The invention, the claims, and the patent’s exclusive rights are 
conceptually seen as synonymous.
38
   
B. General Framework for Patent Law Under the Cult 
Because the cult defines the invention to be whatever is claimed, 
the cult’s patent system simply takes every statutory appearance of the 
invention and replaces it with the claims.
39
  The result is that every 
substantive aspect of patent law is controlled by the claims.  As de-
scribed by one of the leading modern treatises, “the claim defines the 
invention for purposes of both patentability and infringement.”
40
 
The claims in a patent application are conceptual fences that 
mark off the subject matter that the applicant is seeking exclusivity 
over in exchange for their disclosure.  The sole purpose of patent ex-
amination is to determine if the applicant in fact deserves that 
amount of exclusivity.  The patent requirements, 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 
102, 103 & 112, are all seen as ensuring that the exclusive rights are 
commensurate with the information disclosed.  In checking if exclu-
sivity is commensurable with the disclosure, the first step is con-
struing the claim language.  By construing the claim language, we are 
determining the exact subject matter over which the patentee is re-
questing exclusive rights.  The various tests set by the statute are then 
 
 35 Lefstin, supra note 10, at 1145; see also id. at 1145 n.15 (noting the modern 
“synonymy of invention and claim”). 
 36 Id. at 1145. 
 37 MUELLER, supra note 24, at 67 (quoting Judge Giles S. Rich). 
 38 Id. Although he has not used these terms explicitly, Timothy Holbrook has ad-
vocated for a slightly different conceptual definition of the invention.  See Timothy 
Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 125 (2006).  Rather than being 
the claims themselves, the invention is the enabled subject matter.   Id. at 147.  In 
other words, “the invention” that corresponds to a patent specification is all the sub-
ject matter that is enabled by that specification.  As to its substantive reach, his pos-
session-based patent system differs little from the modern system, and Holbrook, like 
the pure claim-centric system, finds no need for a disclosure requirement in addition 
to enablement.  Id. at 133.  In short, his system does not change the substantive reach 
of the claim-centric system, but it does try to provide a more coherent framework for 
a patent system with that substantive reach.  See id. at 125.  
 39 See DONALD CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 8.01 (2008). 
 40 Id. § 7.03. 
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compared against that requested claim scope, and the patent system 
determines if the patentee deserves that claim scope.  The invention 
is the exclusivity that is sought.  If the patentee jumps through all the 
statutory hoops, then that requested claim scope is allowed and it be-
comes the “patented invention,” which defines the exclusivity that 
can be enforced in court.  Chart 1 gives a summary of the process of 
claim validity as understood by the cult, and Figure 1 gives a graphical 
representation of claim scope as understood by the cult. 
 
Chart 1: Valid Claims Under  
Trivial Invention 
 
1. Interpret/construe claims:   
• Purpose of claims: Claims directly demarcate the 
boundary of exclusion.  
• Claim interpretation/construction:  Determine what 
boundary the drafter intended to demarcate.   
• The plain meaning prevails unless idiosyncratic de-
finitions in the specification indicate intent to de-
marcate with other than the plain meaning. 
• Presume that the drafter intends to claim as much as 
the patent system allows (i.e., the patent’s contribu-
tion).  
2. Determine if the claimed subject matter is commensu-
rate with the patent’s contribution: 
• Patent Contribution = Enabled Subject Matter – Ob-
vious Subject Matter 
• Enabled subject matter includes everything that a 
person of skill, after reading the specification, could 
make and use (if asked to) without undue experi-
mentation.   Enabled subject matter extends well 
beyond embodiments invented and disclosed by the 
inventor. 
• The disclosed embodiments form the starting point 
for (not limit of) the enabled subject matter.  
• If a claim is commensurate with the patent’s contri-
bution then it is valid. 
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Figure 1: Claim Scope Under  
Trivial Invention 
 
 
 
C. The Cult and Claim Construction 
The cult’s view of the invention has important implications for 
claim construction.  For the cult, the sole purpose of a claim is to 
communicate a conceptual boundary to people skilled in the art.  
The claims in a patent application are conceptual fences that mark 
off subject matter that the applicants think they deserve in exchange 
for their disclosure.  They are intended to tell potential infringers, 
absent a license from the patent owner, what subject matter they 
should avoid. 
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The words of the claim are then interpreted according to this 
purpose.  The claim terms “bear a ‘heavy presumption’ that they 
mean what they say and have the ordinary meaning that would be at-
tributed to those words by persons skilled in the relevant art.”
41
  Im-
portantly, in this view there is no special relationship between claim 
construction and the specification.  The only time the specification is 
relevant is when “the patentee, acting as his or her own lexicograph-
er, has clearly set forth an explicit definition of the term different 
from its ordinary meaning or . . . if the inventor has disavowed or dis-
claimed scope of coverage.”
42
 
Importantly, the cult presumes that claim drafters will attempt to 
claim all that they can.  As will be shown below, the cult’s views on 
enablement allow quite broad claims for fairly meager disclosures 
and this in turn means that, according to the cult, claim construction 
should also avoid canons of construction that would prevent paten-
tees from accessing such broad claims.  As suggested below, in the 
cult’s view, patent claims can regularly extend beyond the embodi-
ments explicitly disclosed and examined in the specification.  Claim 
language should not be interpreted to be limited to those embodi-
ments.  For this reason, the cult is very wary of the use of the specifi-
cation in claim interpretation because it may tempt judges to “read[] 
limitations from the specification into the claim.”
43
 
D. The Cult, Disclosure, and Ultimate Claim Scope 
In the cult’s vision for patent law, the disclosure requirements 
play a critical role; they ensure that the claims are roughly commen-
surate with the disclosure.  The disclosure requirements ask “the . . . 
fundamental question: To what scope of protection is this applicant’s 
particular contribution to the art entitled?”
44
 
The disclosure requirements found in 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 1
45
 re-
quire a specification that 
contain[s] a written description of the invention, and of the 
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, 
concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art 
 
 41 Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1201–02 (Fed. Cir. 
2002). 
 42 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
 43 Id. at 1323. 
 44 In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 606 (C.C.P.A. 1977). 
 45 For ease of discussion, 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 1 will refer only to the non-best mode 
portion of the statute. 
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to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to 
make and use the same.
46
 
Two sub-requirements are generally found in this language: the writ-
ten description requirement and enablement.  The written descrip-
tion requirement is generally rooted in the requirement that the spe-
cification shall contain “a written description of the invention,” while 
the enablement requirement is rooted in the language mandating 
“such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person 
skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly 
connected, to make and use [the invention].”
47
 
For the cult, the standard procedure is to replace references to 
the invention with the claims.  And indeed this procedure is followed 
even for the disclosure requirements.  “The invention is, for purposes 
of the ‘written description’ inquiry, whatever is now claimed.”
48
  Similar-
ly, “[t]he ‘invention’ that must be enabled is that defined by the par-
ticular claim or claims of the patent or patent application.”
49
  Taking 
that definition and applying it to the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 
112 leads to a disclosure requirement that reads: 
The specification shall contain a written description of the 
[claimed subject matter], and of the manner and process of mak-
ing and using [the claimed subject matter], in such full, clear, 
concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art 
to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to 
make and use the [claimed subject matter] . . . .
50
 
Interpreting this language in light of a trivial vision of the invention 
produces immediate implications.  First, the statute asks that the pa-
tentee file “a written description of the [claimed subject matter].”
51
  
Many claims are filed with the initial application. These are called 
original claims.  Under the trivial theory of invention, these originally 
filed claims easily satisfy this first requirement because they are by de-
finition written. 
This is not true, however, of later filed claims.  Claims can be 
added or modified during patent prosecution and, for those claims to 
be valid, the patentee must show that the original specification pro-
vided “a written description of the [claimed subject matter].”
52
  When 
 
 46 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 1 (2006). 
 47 Id. 
 48 Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1991).  
 49 CHISUM, supra note 39, § 7.03. 
 50 § 112 ¶ 1. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. 
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the specification is viewed this way, a patentee can only add a claim 
later if his initial specification indicates some intent to claim that lat-
er-added subject matter.  In other words, under the trivial vision of 
the invention, the written description requirement only serves a pub-
lic notice function and only applies to later filed claims.  Indeed, this 
relatively minor notice and support-policing function for non-original 
claims has been urged by commentators and some Federal Circuit 
judges as the only function of the written description requirement.
53
  
Second, in contrast to the relatively minor role for written de-
scription, the trivial vision of the invention assigns a very important 
role to enablement.
54
  That requirement is founded on the statutory 
language that the specification must contain “such full, clear, concise, 
and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art . . . to make 
and use the [claimed subject matter].”
55
  Enablement is generally 
seen as “uncontroversial,”
56
 and the more important of the two
57
 re-
quirements as it ensures that the grant of exclusive rights is “com-
mensurate” with the “contribution” or “teaching” of a patent’s disclo-
sure.  It is the primary regulator that “embodies the quid pro quo of 
the patent system that an inventor’s exclusive rights be commensu-
rate with the benefits conferred on society by his disclosure.”
58
 
In particular, the cult’s vision for patent law enablement allows 
quite broad claim scope. An applicant that “enable[s] any embodi-
ment [within the scope of a claim] satisfies the enablement require-
ment regardless of the breadth of the claims.”
59
  This was described by 
Robin Feldman as “the one embodiment doctrine.”
60
  For example, in 
Gemstar–TV Guide International, Inc. v. ITC, the Federal Circuit stated 
that “[t]his court has expressly rejected the contention that if a pa-
 
 53 See Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 982 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
(Rader, J., dissenting); Mueller, supra note 34, at 618–23.   
 54 See Enzo Biochem, Inc., 323 F.3d at 982 (Rader, J., dissenting). 
 55 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 1 (2006). 
 56 Lefstin, supra note 10, at 1153.   
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. at 1182. 
 59 Bernard Chao, Rethinking Enablement in the Predictable Arts: Fully Scoping the New 
Rule, 2009 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3, ¶ 50 (2009);  see also Robert Merges & Richard R. 
Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 845 (1990) 
(“This [enablement] requirement can at times be applied rather loosely: a specifica-
tion that describes only one working example of an invention but that supplies less 
guidance on the subject matter at the fringes of a patent’s claims is often suffi-
cient.”). 
 60 Robin Feldman, The Inventor’s Contribution, 2005 UCLA. J.L. & TECH. 6, 24. 
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tent describes only a single embodiment, the claims of the patent 
must be construed as being limited to that embodiment.”
61
  
In this view, a claim is valid if the specification “enable[s] any 
person skilled in the art . . . to make and use the [claimed subject 
matter].”
62
  The Federal Circuit has further articulated that “[a]ll 
questions of enablement are evaluated against the claimed subject 
matter [and] [t]he focus of the examination inquiry is whether the 
substantial scope of the claim is enabled.”
63
  For example, in the case 
of In re DiLeone, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals explored a 
hypothetical patent specification that “discusses only compound A 
and contains no broadening language of any kind.  This might very 
well enable one skilled in the art to make and use compounds B and 
C.”
64
  In other words, if asked to make and use B and C, a person of 
skill could do so based on the teaching of making and using A alone, 
and thus that patent would be deemed to have enabled A, B, and C.  
But nothing suggests that the inventor had conceived anything 
beyond A. 
This formulation of the enablement inquiry is a leading ques-
tion.  The test has been applied by looking at the embodiments cov-
ered by a claim and asking a person of skill in the art if she could 
make and use those embodiments if asked to.  The enablement test it-
self supplies critical information.  It tells the person of skill what we 
want her to make and use, and because of that, the enablement in-
quiry, as interpreted by the cult, allows claims to cover subject matter 
not conceived by the inventor. 
 
 61 383 F.3d 1352, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, 
Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 906 (Fed. Cir. 2004))(internal quotation marks omitted); see also  
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc); Gemstar-TV 
Guide, 383 F.3d at 1366 (“Our precedent has emphasized that the disclosure in the 
written description of a single embodiment does not limit the claimed invention to 
the features described in the disclosed embodiment.”).  The Liebel-Flarsheim court al-
so noted: 
Even when the specification describes only a single embodiment, the 
claims of the patent will not be read restrictively unless the patentee 
has demonstrated a clear intention to limit the claim scope using 
“words or expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction.”  
Liebel-Flarsheim, 358 F.3d at 906 (quoting Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 
F.3d 1313, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). 
 62 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 1 (2006). 
 63 AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac,  344 F.3d 1234, 1241 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (quoting In re 
Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). 
 64 436 F.2d 1404, 1405 n.l (C.C.P.A. 1971); see also Mark D. Janis, On Courts Herd-
ing Cats: Contending with the “Written Description” Requirement (and Other Unruly Patent 
Disclosure Doctrines), 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 55 (2000). 
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Importantly, the embodiments disclosed in the specification are 
not the limit of the allowable subject matter; rather, they form the starting 
point from which the claim scope negotiation begins.  The claims can 
extend to any subject matter that “one skilled in the art, after reading 
the[] disclosures, could practice . . .without undue experimenta-
tion.”
65
 
The result is that “[c]laims are frequently a far cry from what the 
inventor invented.”
66
  For example, a recent paper describes the rela-
tively uncontroverted conventional view that 
despite the black-letter rule that an inventor can lawfully claim 
only what he has invented and described, courts and the Patent 
Office typically allow patent claims that are of much broader 
scope than what is actually disclosed in a patent application.  Spe-
cifically, a patent will usually disclose just one or a few embodi-
ments of the invention in the patent’s specification, but will often 
claim thousands of different embodiments in a claim.
67
 
Similarly, others describe that “the patent system allows an inventor 
to reach to far more than what the inventor has actually done.”
68
  And 
Janice Mueller has argued that the patent system generally “has al-
ways provided more in terms of patent scope than merely those em-
bodiments expressly disclosed by the inventor in her application.”
69
  
As will be shown in Part III, this broad allowable claim scope forms 
the central criticism of the cult’s view as it allows claims that exceed 
the limits set by the statute and the Constitution. 
* * * * 
In conclusion, the cult, by applying its bedrock principle to the 
patent statute, has developed a particular vision of both the disclo-
sure requirements and claim interpretation.  The disclosure re-
quirements are characterized by a heavy emphasis on enablement 
and no role for written description in the context of original claims.  
Patentees are allowed to claim any and all subject matter that could be 
made by a person of skill (without undue experimentation)
70
 after 
reading the specification if she was asked to.  Furthermore, as claims 
represent a patent’s exclusionary boundaries, claim construction aims 
to determine what boundary of exclusion the applicant sought to 
 
 65 Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 66 MUELLER, supra note 24, at 67 (quoting Judge Giles S. Rich). 
 67 Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 356 
(2010)(internal quotations and citations omitted). 
 68 Feldman, supra note 60, at 24. 
 69 Mueller, supra note 34, at 651. 
 70 See In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 736–37 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
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demarcate.  This puts a heavy emphasis on the plain meaning of the 
claim terms.  And as the cult would allow quite broad claims that ex-
tend well beyond the specification, the cult aims to avoid importing 
limitations from the specification.  The next Part will show that this 
vision of the patent system is wrong and it leads to numerous prob-
lems in patent law, especially for the disclosure requirements, the ul-
timate scope of claims, and for claim interpretation. 
III. SUBSTANTIVE INVENTION AND ITS VISION FOR PATENT LAW 
This Part argues that the cult’s view of the invention is wrong.  In 
the correct view, the subject matter invented by the inventor exists 
before a patent is ever filed and before any claims have been written.  
Inventors provide utility because they solve problems.  The thing in-
vented by inventors is their solution to some problem; it is the inven-
tor’s means to some useful end.  It is the solution that has been con-
ceived by the inventor in enough detail so that it is capable of being 
reduced to practice.  With this substantive view of the invention, a dif-
ferent patent system emerges from the patent statute.
71
  Not only is 
this the correct interpretation but it also leads to a patent system with 
improved accuracy and precision. 
The substantive view of the invention leads to a patent system in 
which validity is divided into two sections.  The ultimate goal is to de-
termine if the patent application contains a “patentable invention.”
72
  
This entails two distinct determinations.  First, what was invented?  
And then, is that invention patentable?  The first determination is 
made by a combination of 35 U.S.C. § 101 and the disclosure re-
quirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶¶ 1–2.  Section 101 is a threshold in-
quiry asking whether anything has been invented, and if so, § 112 de-
 
 71 Tun-Jen Chiang has described something similar and called it the “unitary in-
vention principle.”  Chiang, supra note 23, at 8.  And though he introduces this con-
cept he quickly discards the idea.  “The problem is that the unitary invention prin-
ciple is simply untrue.  The specification and the claims do not describe the same 
thing in different ways. They describe entirely different concepts with only tenuous 
relation to each other.  The specification describes a single embodiment.  The claim 
describes an idea.”  Id. at 10.  This critique wholly miscomprehends the contents of 
most patent specifications.  First, though most specifications do focus attention on 
one particular embodiment, they certainly do not describe just one embodiment.  It 
is quite conventional and routine for a specification to describe a large number, even 
an infinite set of alternative embodiments in addition to the preferred embodiment.  
See Oskar Liivak, Finding Invention 6–7(Jan. 3, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on 
file with author).  Second, as the claims themselves are part of the specification, the 
claims, especially when they employ structural language, can and often do themselves 
disclose alternate embodiments.  Id. 
 72 See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006). 
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termines what exactly was invented.  The disclosure requirements  ask 
applicants to disclose their invention and to distinctly claim it.  A 
claim complies with the requirements of § 112 if the specification can 
corroborate that the inventor invented the claimed subject matter.
73
  
After determining that a claim and its specification have complied 
with 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶¶ 1–2, then we can conclude that the claimed 
subject matter is part of the invention.  This ensures that the claims 
are accurate proxies for the invention.
74
  By way of these statutory 
provisions, patent law can determine what the invention disclosed in 
the application is.   
Next, patent law must determine if that invention is patentable.  
This determination is made by 35 U.S.C. §§ 102–03.  If the invention 
(now determined to be co-extensive with the claimed subject matter) 
satisfies these requirements, then patent law can conclude that the 
claimed subject matter also defines a patentable invention, and the 
claim can be used to define the patent’s exclusive rights.
75
  Chart 2 
summarizes the process of claim validity under a substantive vision of 
the invention, and Figure 2 gives a graphical representation of claim 
scope under this system.  The following sections further elaborate on 
this framework. 
 
 
 
 
 
 73 See Brief for Oskar Liivak as Amicus Curiae Supporting Defendant-Appellant 
12, Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (No. 2008-
1248), 2009 WL 4616152, at *15 [hereinafter Liivak Brief].  
 74 Lefstin, supra note 10, at 1198. 
Even after claiming assumed primary importance, “the Invention” and 
“the claims” were distinct concepts in American patent law.  One could 
discuss “the invention” in terms of the inventor’s physical or mental 
creation, entirely apart from the question of the scope of the inventor’s 
legal rights.  Under such a regime, questions of whether the inventor 
physically possessed an embodiment of the invention, or whether the 
inventor mentally possessed the idea behind the invention, are sensible 
questions.  But once the concepts of “invention” and “claim” became 
essentially synonymous in patent law, the notion of “possessing the in-
vention” became a logical impossibility except as a rephrasing of the ul-
timate legal conclusion. 
Id. (internal citation omitted). 
 75 As noted above, these provisions that examine patentable subject matter, utili-
ty, novelty, and obviousness explicitly reference the invention.   But the previous de-
terminations lead to the conclusion that the claim satisfies 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶¶ 1–2; 
these later determinations about patentability can be administered by reference to 
the claim alone. 
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Chart 2: Claim Validity with  
Substantive Invention 
 
1. Determine what is the claimed invention: 
• Determine what is the invention.  
Read the specification and determine what embodiments 
have been disclosed.   
An embodiment is disclosed if a person of skill, after read-
ing the specification, would be directed to and enabled to 
make and use that embodiment. 
• Determine what is the claimed invention. 
The purpose of claims is to circumscribe a subset of the 
disclosed embodiments.  The disclosed embodiments are 
central to (and a fundamental limit on) proper claim in-
terpretation.  
• A claim is valid under § 112 ¶¶ 1–2 if it only circum-
scribes embodiments disclosed in the specification. 
• The set of embodiments fenced by valid claims un-
der § 112 ¶¶ 1–2 form the “claimed invention.”  
2. Determine what portion of the claimed invention is 
patentable: 
• Is the claimed invention new? 
• Is the claimed invention nonobvious? 
• If so, the claimed invention is patentable. 
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Figure 2: Claim Scope with  
Substantive Invention 
 
 
Compared to the current system, such an invention-centric sys-
tem improves the uniformity of the disclosure requirements because 
it gives a very natural reading to § 112 as a whole.  It improves un-
iformity in claim construction because it gives claims contextual 
meaning.  Claims are not written to directly delineate the boundaries 
of exclusion.
76
  Claims highlight subsets of the embodiments disclosed 
in the specification.  And knowing why the claims were written, 
judges can then turn to the specification to determine which subset 
the inventor intended each claim to delineate.  This aids uniformity 
 
 76 The grant of exclusion does not directly mention claims; instead, it references 
the “patentable invention.”  See id. § 271(a). 
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and precision in claim interpretation.  Claims still aid in marking the 
boundaries of exclusion but they do so indirectly.  Exclusion extends 
to the patented invention and the claims are tools that help us pin-
point the contents of the patented invention.  
This Part will proceed by first elaborating on the support for this 
substantive view of the invention.  It will then outline the overall pa-
tent system that this view produces and show that, in this view, disclo-
sure serves the important purpose of corroborating that the applicant 
did indeed invent the claimed subject matter.  Importantly,  exclu-
sion is thus limited to subject matter actually invented by the inven-
tor. 
A. The Invention Is the Set of Embodiments Conceived by the Inventor 
The invention, “[t]he thing patented[,] is the particular means 
devised by the inventor by which [a] result is attained.”
77
  Importantly, 
the desired result, the “object” of the invention, is not the invention 
itself.
78
  The invention is the inventor’s own specific way of solving 
some relevant problem.  An inventor can claim “the exclusive right to 
use the means he specifies to produce the result or effect he de-
scribes, and nothing more.”
79
 
The Supreme Court and patent law generally have further re-
fined this by turning to the notion of conception.  In 1854, the Court 
described “[t]he ‘inventor,’ in patent law, [a]s the person or persons 
who conceived the patented invention.”
80
  More recently the Supreme 
Court has held that “the word ‘invention’ in the Patent Act unques-
tionably refers to the inventor’s conception.”
81
  Likewise one of the 
most influential treatises in patent law emphasizes this important 
link, stating, “An inventor, in the meaning of the Constitution, is one 
who has himself conceived the fundamental idea of the invention, 
and has embodied it in tangible materials.  To him and to him only 
can a patent lawfully be granted.”
82
 
Other references to inventing or inventor in patent law already 
focus on conception.  For inventorship, patent law determines who 
invented an invention based on conception, as “[c]onception is the 
 
 77 Electric R.R. Signal Co. v. Hall Railway Signal Co., 114 U.S. 87, 96 (1885). 
 78 Id. 
 79 O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 119 (1854). 
 80 Collar Co. v. Van Dusen, 90 U.S. 530, 563–64 (1874). 
 81 Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., 525 U.S. 55, 60–61 (1998). 
 82 1 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS § 57, at 91 
(1890). 
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touchstone of inventorship.”
83
  For priority determinations, patent law 
determines when an inventor invents based on conception.
84
  Consis-
tent with this usage, determining what was invented should also begin 
by looking to the inventor’s conception.  As noted in O’Reilly v. Morse, 
when the Court turned to “ascertain and settle, what is the thing 
which was invented,” the Court instructed that “to this end it will be 
most convenient to begin at its conception.”
85
 
In particular, conception elaborates on the notion of the inven-
tor’s specific means for solving some problem.  “Conception is the 
‘formation in the mind of the inventor, of a definite and permanent 
idea of the complete and operative invention, as it is hereafter to be 
applied in practice.’”
86
  In accord with the discussion above, “[i]t is 
not sufficient that the result to be obtained be conceived, but it is re-
quired that there be conceived and disclosed the means provided to 
accomplish that result.”
87
 
Importantly, conception is complete when “[a]ll that remains to 
be accomplished, in order to perfect the act or instrument, belongs 
to the department of construction, not invention.”
88
  It is complete 
“when [the idea] has assumed such shape in the mind that it can be 
described and illustrated; when the inventor is ready to instruct the 
mechanic in relation to putting it in working form.”
89
  A conception is 
complete and capable of being reduced to practice when an inventor 
is able to tell the ordinary mechanic both what is the specific, com-
plete invention as well as how to make and use that invention. 
In their casebook, John Duffy and Robert Merges emphasize that 
“conception” in patent law demands rigor: 
There must be a “definite” and “permanent” idea of the “com-
plete” and “operative” invention.  Conception does not occur un-
til the inventive idea is “crystallized in all of its essential attributes 
and becomes so clearly defined in the mind of the inventor as to 
 
 83 Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1227–28 (Fed. Cir. 
1994). 
 84 See Marconi Wireless Tel. Co. v. United States, 320 U.S. 1, 34–35 (1943) (“It is 
well established that as between two inventors priority of invention will be awarded to 
the one who by satisfying proof can show that he first conceived the invention.”). 
 85 56 U.S. 62, 68 (1854). 
 86 Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 
1986)(quoting 1 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS 532 (1980)); see also 
Field v. Knowles, 183 F.2d 593, 611 (C.C.P.A. 1950).  
 87 Field, 183 F.2d at 691. 
 88 Mergenthaler v. Scudder, 11 App. D.C. 264, 276 (D.C. Cir. 1897). 
 89 Cameron & Everett v. Brick, 1871 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 89, 90.  
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be capable of being converted to reality and reduced to practice 
by the inventor or by one skilled in the art.”
90
 
The Federal Circuit has held that “[c]onception requires both 
the idea of the invention’s structure and possession of an operative 
method of making it.”
91
  For example, in Board of Education ex rel. Flor-
ida State University v. American Bioscience, Inc., the Federal Circuit de-
termined that a researcher could not be included as an inventor 
when he had not conceived of the claimed compound itself but had 
only conceived of a generalized method by which a person of skill in 
the art, if asked to synthesize the claimed compound, could do so.
92
 
As used here, conception provides a vehicle for determining 
what was invented.  On first impression, it may not seem so hard to 
point out what the inventor created.  After all, the inventor built her 
new mousetrap or created her new drug, and is that not her inven-
tion?
93
  Indeed the inventor’s actual physical creation will be some-
thing she conceived, but it has long been rightly thought that the in-
vention can and should, in many cases, extend further than the 
physical embodiment actually built and should embrace some more 
abstract notion.
94
  The invention is the set of all of the embodiments 
that the inventor has invented.  That is, the invention is the set of 
embodiments conceived by the inventor in enough detail so that 
each of those embodiments is capable of being actually reduced to 
practice.  This abstract concept, this collection of embodiments, is of-
ten much larger than just the embodiments that are actual reduced 
to practice.  Inventing some non-zero number of embodiments (ei-
ther actually or constructively reduced to practice) is a prerequisite 
for starting the patent procurement process.
95
 In addition, that set of 
 
 90 ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY:  
CASES AND MATERIALS 450 (4th ed. 2008) (quoting Brown v. Barbacid, 2765 F.3d 1327 
(Fed. Cir. 2002)). 
 91 Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1991); see 
also Oka v. Youssefyeh, 849 F.2d 581, 583 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
 92 333 F.3d 1330, 1341–42 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see also Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164 
(Fed. Cir. 1993). 
 93 In patent law not every patentable invention is actually reduced to practice.  
U.S. patent law also allows what is known as constructive reduction to practice.  
When the patent applicant describes an invention in enough detail to satisfy the dis-
closure requirements, then patent law describes the invention as being constructively 
reduced to practice.  See DONALD CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 10.05 (2008).  
 94 Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 708 (1880) (“[Tilghman’s patent] must be 
sustained as a patent for a process, and not merely for the particular mode of apply-
ing and using the process pointed out in the specification.”).  
 95 It is quite similar to the “ready for patenting” standard announced in Pfaff v. 
Wells, 525 U.S. 55 (1998). 
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invented embodiments forms a fundamental and substantive limit to 
the exclusive rights that may ultimately emerge from the patent sys-
tem. 
B. Substantive Invention and a Coherent Framework for Patent Law 
Applying this substantive vision of the invention, a coherent pa-
tent system emerges.  It leads to a patent system in which validity is 
divided into two sections.
96
  As stated above, patent law must deter-
mine if the patent application contains a “patentable invention.”
97
  
This entails two distinct determinations.  First, determining what was 
invented.  And then, determining if (or what portion of) the inven-
tion is patentable.  The first determination is made by 35 U.S.C. § 101 
in concert with  35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶¶ 1–2.  Section 101 is mainly a thre-
shold question asking if anything at all has been invented and if that 
invention falls into one of the statutory classes of patentable subject 
matter.  If something has been invented then 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶¶ 1–2 
answers in more detail what was in fact invented.98  Next, patent law 
must determine if that invention is patentable.  This determination is 
made by 35 U.S.C. §§  102 and 103.  If the invention is patentable, 
then the applicant receives exclusive rights over that invention.  This 
section explores the details of these two determinations. 
1. Section 101 & 112 ¶¶ 1–2: Determining What Is the 
Invention 
Together § 101 and § 112 allow patent law to determine what 
was invented.  Section 101 is a threshold question that simply asks if 
any embodiment has been invented that fits the listed types of pa-
tentable subject matter while § 112 provides the more detailed analy-
sis of what exactly was invented. 
To understand the proper role for the disclosure requirements 
of § 112 ¶¶ 1–2, it is best (at first) to look at them from the perspec-
 
 96 See 35 U.S.C. chs. 10 & 11 (2006). 
 97 See id. § 271. 
 98 In this article 35 U.S.C. § 101 is grouped with § 112.   A more thorough discus-
sion of § 101 is beyond the scope of this Article, and it is included here primarily for 
the sake of completeness.  But note that this particular grouping could be further 
explored to help explain things like the strong overlap between § 101 utility and       
§ 112 enablement based utility.  Similarly the grouping can provide a needed link to 
explain the overlap and resulting confusion surrounding classification of cases like 
O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 120–21 (1854).  This case is exemplary of cases that are 
alternatively referred to as patentable-subject-matter cases or enablement cases.  By 
grouping § 101 and § 112 together with the unified purpose of determining what was 
invented, patent law may be able to provide a more coherent understanding of their 
relationship and overall meaning.  
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tive of an inventor applying for a patent.  Starting with Chapter 11 of 
35 U.S.C. entitled “Application for Patent,” an applicant sees that § 
111 requires an application to “include a specification as prescribed 
by section 112 of this title; a drawing . . . and an oath by the applicant 
as prescribed by section 115.”
99
  As to the oath, it requires the appli-
cant to swear that “he believes himself to be the original and first in-
ventor of the process, machine, manufacture, or composition of mat-
ter, or improvement thereof, for which he solicits a patent.”
100
  The 
oath requires the inventor to swear to have conceived the invention 
“for which he solicits a patent.”
101
  In other words, the applicant can 
only seek exclusive rights over subject matter that he himself created 
and that exists in his mind as a “definite,” “permanent,” “complete,” 
and “operative” form with enough detail that a person of skill can be 
“instructed . . . to put[] it in working form.”
102
 
After reading about the oath, the inventor turns to § 112 ¶ 1.  
There the applicant finds quite familiar language.  It requires that 
the application must contain a specification that 
shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the 
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, 
concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art 
to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to 
make and use the same.
103
 
This language mirrors the language for a completed conception.  
The inventor sees two things that need to be included: a written de-
scription of the invention, and the manner and process of making 
and using the invention.  And the provision instructs that this de-
scription be in enough detail so that it “enable[s] any person skilled 
in the art . . . to make and use the [invention].”
104
  If indeed an inven-
tor has a completed conception in mind (as he has sworn in the 
oath), then satisfying the requirement of § 112 ¶ 1 is quite easy.  The 
applicant is simply asked to write down this already existing com-
pleted conception.
105
 
 
 99 See id. § 111. 
 100 See id. § 115. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Cameron & Everett v. Brick, 1871 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 89, 90 (1871).  
 103 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 1.  As suggested earlier, this article is setting aside the best 
mode requirement of ¶ 1. 
 104 Id. 
 105 See Liivak Brief, supra note 73, at *12 (“[Section] 112 quite reasonably requires 
the patent applicant to simply write down that mental conception.  This converts the 
subjective inquiry of whether the claimed subject matter was conceived by the inven-
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The applicant then turns to ¶ 2 of § 112 and sees that it instructs 
the applicant to “conclude [the specification] with one or more 
claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject 
matter which the applicant regards as his invention.”
106
  This is also 
relatively clear in the context of a substantive vision of the invention 
and § 112 ¶ 1.  Having disclosed a set of embodiments, along with 
how to make and use them, the applicant is instructed to distinctly 
claim the embodiments “for which he solicits a patent . . .”
107
 in part 
to avoid confusing the embodiments themselves with the description 
of how to make and use those embodiments.
108
  The claims are writ-
ten attempts to circumscribe varying subsets of the embodiments dis-
closed in the specification. 
Section 112 ¶ 2 defines the subject matter for which the appli-
cant seeks a patent.  By way of the oath in § 115, the applicant swears 
to be the inventor of that subject matter.  And as required by § 112 ¶ 
1, the specification must contain enough detail to serve as proof that 
the inventor did indeed invent the claimed subject matter.  The spe-
cification provides proof that (as of the filing date of the patent ap-
plication) the inventor conceived the claimed subject matter in 
enough detail so that a person of skill could make and use the 
claimed subject matter.  When courts now consider conception in the 
context of inventorship or priority, they “require corroborating evi-
dence.”
109
  Section 112 ¶ 1 has a similar coherent purpose.  It simply 
asks whether the specification can objectively corroborate that the pa-
tentee conceived and invented the claimed subject matter.
110
  When 
an applicant can satisfy these requirements, then we can conclude that 
the claimed subject matter has been invented by the applicant.  It al-
lows us to conclude that the claimed subject matter is an accurate and 
precise proxy for the invention. 
 
tor into the objective inquiry of whether the specification can corroborate the inven-
tion of the claimed subject matter.”). 
 106 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 2 (2006). 
 107 Id. § 115. 
 108 The trouble is that patent law allows patents on “process[es], machine[s], 
manufacture[s], or composition[s] of matter.”  Id. § 101.  See generally Lutz, supra 
note 18. 
 109 Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 
1994). 
 110 Liivak Brief, supra note 73, at *32.   
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2.  Sections 102 & 103: Determining If the Invention Is 
Patentable 
The next step is to determine if the claimed invention is patent-
able.  Again looking at the chapter titles within 35 U.S.C., a patent 
examiner finds Chapter 10, entitled “Patentability of Inventions.”  
The Chapter includes §§ 102 and 103, which require the invention to 
be new, nonobvious, and useful patentable subject matter.
111
  For 
those requirements, §§ 102 and 103 refer in general to the invention 
but they also refer to the claimed subject matter.
112
  Having satisfied § 
112 ¶¶ 1–2, patent law can conclude indeed that the subject matter 
claimed by the inventor is at least the subject matter invented and 
disclosed by the inventor.  Only at this point is there no practical dif-
ference between the invention and the claimed subject matter.  In 
other words, after satisfying § 112 ¶¶ 1–2, references to the invention 
in §§ 102 and 103 can then be safely replaced by the claimed subject 
matter.  If a claim satisfies these requirements, then patent law con-
cludes that the claim circumscribes subject matter that is part of the 
patentable invention and the applicant can be granted exclusive 
rights over that subject matter.
113
 
C. Limiting the Patent Grant to the Conceived Invention 
In addition to direct statutory references, there are other very 
compelling reasons to adopt the substantive view.  As suggested in 
Part II, the cult allows claims that extend well beyond the subject mat-
ter disclosed or even contemplated by the inventor.  In contrast, the 
patent system that emerges from the substantive view inherently lim-
its patent claims to subject matter that was conceived and disclosed by 
the inventor.  As shown here, this is not just a statutory limit.  One of 
patent law’s few constitutional limits is that the exclusive rights can 
extend only to the work of the inventor.  In other words, the grant of 
exclusivity can extend only to subject matter conceived by the inven-
tor.  The cult’s patent system violates this limit while the substantive 
invention system inherently respects it. 
The Supreme Court has held on numerous occasions that, at 
most, inventors can claim only that which they themselves invented.  
“[The patentee] can lawfully claim only what he has invented . . . .”
114
  
“[I]t is clear that the party cannot entitle himself to a patent for more 
 
 111 35 U.S.C. §§ 102–03 (2006). 
 112 See id.  
 113 See id. §§ 154, 271.  
 114 O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 120–21 (1854). 
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than his own invention.”
115
  These are not isolated statements.
116
  And 
this limit has teeth.  For example, the Court in O’Reilly concluded 
that “[i]n fine, [Morse] claims an exclusive right to use a manner and 
process which he . . . had not invented. . . .  The court is of opinion 
that the claim is too broad, and not warranted by law.”
117
  In short, “[a 
patentee] can lawfully claim only what he has invented and de-
scribed, and if he claims more his patent is void.”
118
 
Such repeated emphasis on this limit is not surprising.  It stems 
directly from the constitutional mandate in art. I, § 8, cl. 8 to grant 
exclusive rights only to inventors for their discoveries.
119
  In other 
words, the subject matter claimed by a patent is limited to subject 
matter that is original to the inventor, subject matter that was in fact 
invented by the inventor.
120
  As put by Chief Justice Marshall, “it can-
not be doubted that the settled purpose of the United States has ever 
been, and continues to be, to confer on the authors of useful inven-
tions an exclusive right in their inventions for the time mentioned in 
their patent.”
121
 
 
 115 Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. 356, 430 (1822). 
 116 See Ensten v. Simon, Ascher & Co., 282 U.S. 445, 452–53 (1931) (describing the 
“principle which forbids a patentee to assert a right to more than he has actually in-
vented”) (quoting 2 ROBINSON, supra note 86, at 284); Agawam v. Jordan, 74 U.S. 583, 
602 (1869) (“No one is entitled to a patent for that which he did not invent . . . .”); 
Morey v. Lockwood, 75 U.S. 230, 240 (1869) (“Several objections are taken to this 
reissued patent; among others, and which is the most material, that the claim is 
broader than the invention.”);  see also O’Reilly, 56 U.S. at 120 (describing “the evil . . . 
if [a patentee] claims more than he has invented, although no other person has in-
vented it before him”), Wyeth v. Stone, 30 F. Cas. 723, 727 (C.C.D. Mass. 1840) (No. 
18,107) (Story, J.) (“A claim broader than the actual invention of the patentee is, for 
that very reason, upon the principles of the common law, utterly void, and the patent 
is a nullity.”). 
 117 O’Reilly, 56 U.S. at 113. 
 118 Id. at 121; see also Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86, 
98 (1939) (holding that if claims exceed the described invention, then those “claims 
. . . must fail”). 
 119 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 120 See In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 93–94 (1879) (holding that art. I § 8 
Cl. 8 requires originality); R. CARL MOY, MOY’S WALKER ON PATENTS § 1:15 (4th ed. 
2007) (“[In view of the Trade-Mark Cases] it appears that Congress’s authority under 
the intellectual property clause is limited to the protection of subject matter that is 
original to the grantee.”); see also Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 
53, 57–58 (1888) (“An author [of a copyright] in [the constitutional] sense is he to 
whom anything owes its origin; originator; maker . . . .” (internal quotation marks 
and citations omitted)). 
 121 Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. 218, 241 (1832) (Marshall, C.J.) 
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As discussed earlier, despite this clear limit, the cult appears to 
have either forgotten about it
122
 or it has decided to ignore it.  In 
modern patent law, “[c]laims are frequently a far cry from what the 
inventor invented.”
123
  The “Patent Office typically allows patent 
claims that are of much broader scope than what is actually disclosed 
in a patent application.”
124
  This standard does not prevent claims 
from reaching non-original subject matter.  Indeed, in modern pa-
tent law it is commonplace for commentators to state that patent 
claims should routinely extend beyond the embodiments disclosed in 
the specification.  As inventorship and originality are constitutionally 
rooted requirements, the fact that the trivial theory of invention al-
lows for violations of this requirement should be a clear signal that 
the trivial vision is simply the incorrect interpretation.
125
 
In contrast, the substantive theory of the invention leads to a dif-
ferent limit on patent claims, one that respects this constitutional lim-
it.
126
  The substantive invention begins with the subject matter actually 
conceived by the inventor.  Of that, some subset is described in the 
patent specification.  Of that, some subset is claimed.  Of that de-
scribed, claimed invention, some subset is found to be patentable.  
Ultimately the patentable invention (i.e., the resulting grant of exclu-
sive patent rights) extends only to the patentable portions of the 
claimed, described invention.  This necessarily means that the exclu-
sive rights extend to a subset of what was originally invented by the 
inventor.  This inherently limits the exclusive rights to subject matter 
original to the inventor.  As stated by the Supreme Court, “[The pa-
tentee] can lawfully claim only what he has invented and described, 
 
 122 See generally Oskar Liivak, The Forgotten Originality Requirement: A Constitutional 
Hurdle for Gene Patents, 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 261 (2005). 
 123 MUELLER, supra note 24, at 67 (quoting Judge Giles S. Rich). 
 124 Sichelman, supra note 67, at 356.  
 125 See Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 
159, 173 (2001) (“The Court will construe the statute to avoid [raising serious consti-
tutional problems] unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Con-
gress.” (citing Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades 
Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988))).  In addition, note that for this issue of interpre-
tation, Congress’s broad powers under the Commerce Clause are not relevant.  The 
current patent statute was explicitly enacted under the powers granted by the Patent 
and Copyright Clause.  See S. REP. NO. 82-1979 (1952), as reprinted in 1952 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2396. 
 126 This provides another important reason to argue for the substantive interpre-
tation over the cult’s view, as the substantive view inherently respects this limit while 
the cult’s view does not. 
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and if he claims more his patent is void.”
127
  And if claims exceed the 
described invention, those “claims . . . must fail.”
128
 
As suggested above, the trivial theory of invention limits claims 
to subject matter that a person of skill could make and use based on 
the patent specification if asked to.  In contrast, the substantive view 
limits claims to subject matter that a person of skill would make and 
use based on the patent specification.  In the substantive view, the 
disclosure inquiry is not stated as a leading question.  Instead, a per-
son of skill is given the patent specification and asked: Based on this 
document, what things would you construct?  That set of embodi-
ments, that a person of skill would construct, forms the invention dis-
closed by the specification, and the patent claims are limited to those 
embodiments. 
Justice Story described the disclosure requirements in this way: 
It is therefore argued, that if the specification be materially defec-
tive, or obscurely or so loosely worded, that a skillful workman in 
that particular art could not construct the machine, it is a good 
defense against the action, although no intentional deception has 
been practiced.  And this is beyond all question the doctrine of 
the common law; and it is founded in good reason; for the mo-
nopoly is granted upon the express condition, that the party shall 
make a full and explicit disclosure, so as to enable the public, at 
the expiration of his patent, to make and use the invention or 
improvement in as ample and beneficial a manner as the patentee 
himself.  If therefore it be so obscure, loose, and imperfect, that 
this cannot be done, it is defrauding the public of all the consid-
eration, upon which the monopoly is granted.
129
 
A few years later, in The Telephone Cases, the Supreme Court similarly 
stated that the validity of a patent specification asks whether 
[a] good mechanic, of proper skill in matters of the kind, can 
take the patent, and, by following the specification strictly, can, 
without more, construct an apparatus which, when used in the way 
pointed out, will do all that it is claimed the method or process 
will do.
130
 
In other words, under the substantive view, the specification describes 
the invention and the claims circumscribe that same invention.  And 
the only embodiments that can be claimed are those that a person of 
 
 127 O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 121 (1853). 
 128 Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86, 98 (1939). 
 129 Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1122 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600); 
see Turner v. Winter, (1787) 99 Eng. Rep. 1274 (K.B.); The King v. Arkwright, Dav. 
Pat. Case 106 (1785); see also Janis, supra note 64, at 55–56.  
 130 126 U.S. 1, 536 (1888) (emphasis added). 
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skill would make and use based on the patent specification.131  Those 
embodiments are original to the inventor.  The substantive vision of 
the invention leads to a disclosure requirement that inherently re-
spects the foundational limits of the patent system. 
D. The Cult and Its Misreading of Precedent 
This section returns to the Supreme Court cases that have been 
quoted in support of the cult’s vision of the invention.  As shown 
here, reading those quotes with more context shows that those cases 
in fact support the substantive vision and the cult has simply misin-
terpreted them. 
The cult has supported its trivial view of the invention by citation 
to Supreme Court cases such as McClain v. Ortmayer
132
 and Aro Manu-
facturing v. Convertible Top.
133
  Though certainly short quotes from 
these cases seem to indicate support for the trivial view, more com-
prehensive passages from these same sections show that these cases 
are completely consistent and, in fact, instead reinforce the substan-
tive view of the invention.  In McClain, the Supreme Court stated that 
[n]othing is better settled in the law of patents than that the pa-
tentee may claim the whole or only a part of his invention, and 
that if he only describe and claim a part, he is presumed to have 
abandoned the residue to the public.  The object of the patent 
law in requiring the patentee to “particularly point out and dis-
tinctly claim the part, improvement or combination which he 
claims as his invention or discovery,” is not only to secure to him 
all to which he is entitled, but to apprise the public of what is still 
open to them.  The claim is the measure of his right to relief, and 
while the specification may be referred to limit the claim, it can 
never be made available to expand it.
134
 
Similarly in Aro, the Supreme Court stated that 
[s]ince the patentees never claimed the fabric or its shape as their 
invention, and the claims made in the patent are the sole measure 
of the grant, the fabric is no more than an unpatented element of 
the combination which was claimed as the invention, and the pa-
tent did not confer a monopoly over the fabric or its shape.
135
 
 
 131  Sean Seymore has argued along not too dissimilar lines for improved teachings 
in the patent disclosure.  See Sean Seymore, The Teaching Function of Patents, 85 NOTRE 
DAME L REV. 621 (2010). 
 132 141 U.S. 419 (1891). 
 133 365 U.S. 336 (1961). 
 134 McClain, 141 U.S. at 423–24. 
 135 Aro Mfg. Co., 365 U.S. at 339–40. 
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Both of these passages demonstrate that statements like “the claims 
are the sole measure of the grant” are actually quite straightforward 
statements.  In the substantive view, an inventor may invent quite 
broadly.  Of that invention, the inventor may only disclose a limited 
number of embodiments in the specification.  Of those embodiments 
that are disclosed, the inventor might only claim a subset.  With that 
in mind, the Court is just making the relatively straightforward state-
ment that no matter how broadly you might have invented, only the 
embodiments that are claimed will need to comply with the validity 
portions of the patent statute and only the claimed embodiments can 
be infringed.
136
 
Rather than saying that the invention should be defined by the 
claims, it is better to understand these cases as saying that, no matter 
what an inventor actually invented, patent law and the courts will only 
consider what the inventor actually invented, disclosed, and claimed.  
The Court in Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Manufacturing 
Co. described this relationship between the claims and the invention 
by stating that “we are convinced that the exclusive right granted in 
every patent must be limited to the invention described in the claims 
of the patent.”
137
  In other words, the Supreme Court precedent that 
is being used to support the trivial vision of the invention better sup-
ports (when more of the opinion is read in context) the substantive 
view. 
IV. ON THE BENEFITS OF THE SUBSTANTIVE INVENTION FOR PATENT 
LAW 
So far, this Article has outlined the cult’s trivial vision of the in-
vention and the patent system that emerges from that view and has 
then introduced the substantive vision of the invention and its patent 
system.  Currently, as a doctrinal matter, modern patent law exists 
somewhere between these two.  As a definitional matter, modern pa-
tent law still steadfastly stands by the “bedrock principle” at the heart 
of the cult.
138
  Yet in a number of important areas, modern patent law 
is not rigorously following the patent system that would emerge from 
following that principle.  Instead, it is moving toward the system envi-
sioned by the substantive view.  As the substantive view is the correct 
interpretation, this is a good sign, but that move is incomplete.  This 
Part examines two key areas: the disclosure requirements and claim 
 
 136 This leaves questions about the doctrine of equivalents aside for the moment. 
 137 243 U.S. 502, 516 (1917). 
 138 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).  
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interpretation.  It reviews the position each view would take regarding 
each of these areas and then it compares those positions against the 
current state of patent law.  The Part then describes how much fur-
ther patent law needs to move in order to fully come in line with the 
substantive vision of the invention and the benefits that accrue from 
making that change. 
A. Substantive Invention and Disclosure 
Modern patent law’s parsing of the disclosure requirements has 
proven to be controversial and confusing.  Between the two main dis-
closure sub-tests, enablement is generally seen as “uncontroversial”
139
 
and the more important of the two.
140
  Yet even with enablement, 
there is confusion.  There is a “split” in Federal Circuit cases over the 
amount of disclosure required to satisfy enablement.
141
  Some cases 
state that “enabling any embodiment [within the scope of a claim] sa-
tisfies the enablement requirement regardless of the breadth of the 
claims.”
142
  This was described by Robin Feldman as “the one embo-
diment doctrine.”
143
  In contrast, in the unpredictable arts, many cases 
have held that “a single embodiment might not be sufficient to ena-
ble broad claims because [cases dealing with the unpredictable arts] 
required a correspondingly more detailed disclosure to show that a 
person of ordinary skill in the art could use or practice the claimed 
invention.”
144
  Recently the Federal Circuit has adopted the more 
stringent requirements from the unpredictable arts and has applied 
them in the predictable arts.  Now, “disclosing a single embodiment 
will not automatically satisfy the enablement requirement.”
145
  This 
new full scope requirement for the predictable arts appears irrecon-
cilable with those earlier cases.
146
  Scholarly work has started to ques-
tion whether it is even possible to satisfy the new “full scope” doctrine 
 
 139 Lefstin, supra note 10, at 1152. 
 140 Id.; see also Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 982 (Fed. Cir. 
2002) (Rader, J., dissenting). 
 141 Bernard Chao, Rethinking Enablement in the Predictable Arts: Fully Scoping the New 
Rule, 2009 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3, ¶ 7.  
 142 Id. ¶ 50; see also Merges & Nelson, supra note 59, at 845 (“This [enablement] 
requirement can at times be applied rather loosely: a specification that describes only 
one working example of an invention but that supplies less guidance on the subject 
matter at the fringes of a patent’s claims is often sufficient.”). 
 143 Feldman, supra note 60, at 61. 
 144 Chao, supra note 141, ¶ 51. 
 145 Id. ¶ 52 
 146 Id. 
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for enablement,
147
 arguing that “a literal application of the ‘full scope’ 
rule would invalidate every patent in existence.”
148
  “To require a speci-
fication teach how to build every claimed embodiment is thus to de-
mand the impossible.”
149
  This split has yet to be resolved in the 
courts. 
An orthodox application of the cult’s vision would support 
something akin to the one embodiment doctrine.  In that sense the 
more stringent full scope rule appears to back away from strictly ad-
hering to the cult’s vision, and indeed, the substantive vision of the 
invention supports an enablement requirement under which every 
claimed embodiment must be enabled.  Yet current patent law’s view 
on enablement, even in light of the full scope cases, has not reflected 
a coherent adoption or rejection of either vision of the invention and 
instead it lies somewhere in the vague no-man’s land between these 
two distinct views. 
Similar ambiguity surrounds the written description require-
ment, the other sub-test for disclosure.  Over a decade ago, the Fed-
eral Circuit decided Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly.150  
The case applied the written description requirement to original 
claims and affirmed their invalidity.
151
  As suggested in Part II, this is 
directly in conflict with the cult’s vision for the disclosure require-
ments.  This application of the written description requirement out-
side the confines of its public notice role has been called “mis-
guided”
152
 and an “unmitigated disaster.”
153
  Numerous articles have 
 
 147 Lefstin, supra note 10, at 1165–67; see Daniel L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy 
Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1678–80 (2003).  
 148 Chiang, supra note 23, at 18. 
 149 Id. at 19. 
 150  119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 151 Id. at 1569. 
 152 Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 F.3d 1366, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
(Linn, J.,  concurring) (noting that the majority opinion “is supported by our 
precedent” but arguing that the precedent should be overruled en banc).  Jeffrey 
Lefstin, without saying as much, has argued that generally this opposition to the Eli 
Lilly written description requirement stems from the cult and its views.  See Lefstin, 
supra note 10, at 1157 (“Hostility to the written description requirement derives fun-
damentally from the belief that written description is incompatible with the modem 
claim.  The claim is the abstract legal creature at the heart of modem patent law, and 
the cornerstone of the conceptually ordered system pursued by formalist thinkers.  
For those who seek a conceptually ordered system of patent law, written description 
plays no role in a rational modern system . . . .”). 
 153 Harris A. Pitlick, The Mutation on the Description Requirement Gene, 80 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 209, 222 (1998). 
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criticized the written description.
154
  It is accused of creating “a welter 
of confused and confusing precedent that not only defies restatement 
but renders analysis and synthesis distinctly unmanageable.”
155
  Com-
mentators worry that it “only allows very narrow patents, so narrow 
and easily dodged as to be almost worthless.”
156
  In particular, many 
have worried that the requirement is an industry specific “elevated”
157
 
or “super”
158
 enablement requirement that applies disproportionately 
in biotechnology, that for biotechnology it threatens to alienate both 
“business and science communities” as it “no longer reflects the reali-
ties of scientific contribution,”
159
 and “if followed,” would be an “un-
mitigated disaster . . . [that] has the potential for causing untold ha-
voc in the biotechnology field.”
160
  The overall result is, as put by 
Robin Feldman, “a wealth of contradictory opinions and unworkable 
doctrines”
161
 that lack “a comprehensive vision of the problem or how 
to solve it.”
162
 
Recently in the en banc opinion for Ariad v. Eli Lilly, the Federal 
Circuit tried to resolve some of these issues.  The court held that the 
written description requirement applies to original as well as 
amended claims.
163
  The majority found the requirement in the statu-
tory language that the “specification shall contain a written descrip-
tion of the invention.”
164
  The court interpreted that language to re-
quire a description that “‘clearly allow[s] persons of ordinary skill in 
 
 154 See Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co. Inc., 375 F.3d 1303, 1315−21 (Fed. 
Cir. 2004) (listing articles critical of the written description requirement); Christo-
pher M. Holman, Is Lilly Written Description a Paper Tiger?: A Comprehensive Assessment of 
the Impact of Eli Lilly and Its Progeny in the Courts and PTO, 17 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1 
(2007); Mark D. Janis, On Courts Herding Cats: Contending with the “Written Description” 
Requirement (and Other Unruly Patent Disclosure Doctrines), 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 55 
(2000).  
 155 Harmon, supra note 22, at 154. 
 156 Michael Delmas Plimier, Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk & University of Cal-
ifornia v. Eli Lilly and Co., 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 149, 161 (1998).  
 157 Arti K. Rai, Intellectual Property Rights in Biotechnology: Addressing New Technology, 
34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 827, 835 (1999). 
 158 Burk & Lemley, supra note 147, at 1653. 
 159 Mueller, supra note 34, at 615–16. 
 160 Pitlick, supra note 153, at 222. 
 161 Robin Copper Feldman, Rethinking Patenting in Biospace, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 4 
(2005). 
 162 Id. at 3–4. 
 163 Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
(“Neither the statute nor legal precedent limits the written description requirement 
to cases of priority or distinguishes between original and amended claims.”). 
 164 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 1 (2006). 
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the art to recognize that [the inventor] invented what is claimed.’”
165
  
Alternatively, the majority held that “the test for sufficiency is wheth-
er the disclosure of the application relied upon reasonably conveys to 
those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession of the 
claimed subject matter as of the filing date.”
166
  Between these two al-
ternate tests, the court admitted that ‘“possession . . . has never been 
very enlightening”
167
 and it concluded with a summation that relied 
more on the former test.  The court held that, 
whatever the specific articulation, the test requires an objective 
inquiry into the four corners of the specification from the pers-
pective of a person of ordinary skill in the art.  Based on that in-
quiry, the specification must describe an invention understanda-
ble to that skilled artisan and show that the inventor actually 
invented the invention claimed.
168
 
Though Ariad certainly moved patent law away from a pure cult vision 
for disclosure and closer to the substantive vision of invention, an ex-
plicit adoption of the substantive vision did not occur, and there re-
main important unresolved issues. 
First, the opinion “reaffirm[ed] that § 112, first paragraph, con-
tains a written description requirement separate from enablement.”
169
  
In other words, enablement presumably does something apart from 
written description.  To show that “the inventor actually invented the 
invention claimed”
170
 requires showing both conception of the inven-
tion itself as well as how to make and use it.  Both need to be dis-
closed in enough detail so that any person of skill in the art could 
make and use the invention.  In order to comply with the Ariad test 
for written description, the specification must, as part of that test, sa-
tisfy the enablement test.  In short, the en banc Federal Circuit in 
Ariad held that there was a separate written description requirement 
apart from enablement; yet after Ariad, there appears to be no 
enablement requirement separate from written description. 
In addition to this issue, the Ariad opinion tied its written de-
scription requirement only to the statutory language that the specifi-
cation “contain a written description of the invention.”
171
  The trouble 
 
 165 Ariad Pharms., 598 F.3d at 1351 (second alteration in original) (quoting Vas-
Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).  
 166 Id.  
 167 Id. 
 168 Id. 
 169 Id. at 1340. 
 170 Id. at 1351. 
 171 Ariad Pharms., 598 F.3d at 1344. 
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is that, in my opinion, it then requires an awkward reading of the rest 
of the statute.  In that view, the enablement requirement is then pro-
vided by the language requiring that the specification “shall contain a 
written description . . . of the manner and process of making and us-
ing [the invention], in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to 
enable any person skilled in the art . . . to make and use the [inven-
tion].”
172
  This seems like an unnecessarily strained reading of the sta-
tute, and Judge Rader and Judge Linn, the dissenters-in-part in Ariad, 
pounced on that issue: 
This court, however, calves the “written description of the inven-
tion” language out of its context in the rest of the paragraph.  In 
this court’s strained reading, the prepositional phrases that follow 
apply only to a “written description . . . of the manner and process 
of making and using” the invention, not to a “written description 
of the invention.”
173
 
Though Judge Rader and Judge Linn are likely the strongest and 
most vocal current supporters for the cult of the claim, I agree with 
them on this parsing of the statute, yet I very much disagree with 
their interpretation.  As shown above, with a substantive vision of the 
invention, 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶¶ 1–2 as a whole requires that the specifi-
cation can establish that the applicant invented and disclosed the 
claimed subject matter in the specification.  With this broad holistic 
rule, we do not have to break § 112 ¶ 1 into subtests of enablement 
and written description. 
In fact, Judge Newman in her additional views suggested some-
thing similar when she noted that we need not focus so much on the 
particular subtests: 
In my view, the overriding policy of patent systems requires both 
written description and enablement, and it is less critical to de-
cide which statutory clause applies in a particular case, than to as-
sure that both requirements are met. . . .  As the court debates the 
relationship between “written description” and “enablement,” let 
us not lose sight of the purpose of Section 112.
174
 
Indeed, such worries about parsing the disclosure requirements have 
existed for a long time.  In 1854, the leading treatise of the time 
commented that “the statute requisites for a good specification run so 
 
 172 Id. at 1343; see also 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 1 (2006).  As suggested earlier, this Article 
is ignoring the best mode requirement of ¶ 1.  
 173 Ariad Pharms., 598 F.3d at 1362 (Rader, J., dissenting in part and concurring in 
part); see also id. at 1367 (Linn, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).  
 174 Id. at 1359 (majority opinion). 
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much into each other, in their nature and character, and are so 
blended together that it is difficult to treat of them separately.”
175
 
The substantive view of the invention leads to a natural solution 
of all these issues as it does not need to separate enablement or writ-
ten description but instead gives purpose and meaning to the whole 
of the disclosure requirement in § 112 ¶ 1.
176
  The disclosure re-
quirement ensures that the specification can corroborate that the in-
ventor did indeed invent the claimed subject matter.  That gives a 
clear overarching purpose to § 112 ¶ 1.  Certainly patent law can ela-
borate on the details of the requirements by generally putting the de-
scription of the embodiments themselves under the written descrip-
tion heading while putting their making and use under enablement. 
B. Substantive Invention: Giving Claims Contextual Meaning 
In addition to problems with disclosure, there is growing evi-
dence that claim interpretation is just not a uniform process.
177
  
“[C]ourts seem unable to agree on what particular patent claims 
mean.”
178
  The promise of certainty made by peripheral claiming ap-
pear “to be an illusion.”
179
  In short, the modern peripheral claiming 
system “isn’t working.”
180
 
In recent years the Federal Circuit has tried to make claim inter-
pretation more predictable.  One such attempt, Phillips v. AWH Corp., 
aimed to resolve the proper methodology for interpreting claims.
181
  
The controversy developed because of a split in the Federal Circuit’s 
claim interpretation case law.  One line of cases emphasized the spe-
cification as the most important source for resolving claim interpreta-
tion issues.  Meanwhile, another line of cases, most notably Texas Digi-
tal Systems, Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc.,
182
 developed.  It voiced concern over  
“reading limitations from the specification into the claim[s],”
183
 and 
put a heavy emphasis on the use of dictionaries rather than turning 
 
 175 GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, THE LAW OF PATENTS 189 (1854). 
 176 Throughout this Article, disclosure requirement, or § 112 ¶ 1, has meant to 
include the language associated with written description and enablement only.  Best 
mode is not included in these discussions. 
 177 Daniel L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts–Rethinking Patent 
Claim Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743, 1744 (2009).  
 178 Id. 
 179 Id. at 1745. 
 180 Id. at 1744. 
 181 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
 182 308 F.3d 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 183 Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323. 
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immediately to the specification.  The Texas Digital line of cases wor-
ried that if the specification granted unfettered control over the 
claim interpretation process, then if a patentee described only one or 
a very limited number of specific embodiments, the patentee’s claims 
would be similarly limited to those specific embodiments.
184
  The Tex-
as Digital line of cases is closely related to the cult’s view of claims and 
to its support for the one embodiment rule. 
Phillips resolved this immediate intra-circuit controversy.  The 
court rejected the Texas Digital approach of relying primarily on dic-
tionary plain meaning for claims, and it described the proper sources 
for information for claim interpretation and the relative weight and 
priority among them.  After Phillips, it is clear that amongst sources 
the specification is the most important in claim interpretation.  The 
Phillips court held that “claims ‘must be read in view of the specifica-
tion, of which they are a part.’ . . .  [T]he specification ‘is always high-
ly relevant . . . [and] [u]sually, it is dispositive; it is the single best 
guide to the meaning of a disputed term.’”
185
  Phillips downgraded the 
importance of dictionaries and treatises, rejecting the Texas Digital 
view that “the use of the dictionary may extend patent protection 
beyond what should properly be afforded by the inventor’s patent.”
186
 
In other words, Phillips settled the immediate methodological 
conflict, and indeed its emphasis on the specification signaled a vic-
tory for the substantive view of the invention.  Yet the victory was far 
from complete, and indeed there continue to be serious issues in 
claim interpretation.  As Hal Wegner very recently warned, until 
something is changed, “there will never be clarity in claim construc-
tion.”
187
  The problem is that Phillips explicitly refused to decide the 
more fundamental divide that Texas Digital represented.  Phillips reaf-
firmed the dangers, emphasized by Texas Digital, “of reading limita-
tions from the specification into the claim.”
188
  In other words, it re-
solved the immediate procedural conflict but it did nothing to resolve 
the conceptual conflict that had created the procedural conflict.  The 
court acknowledged that reconciling these two “can be difficult,”
189
 
yet ultimately reassured us that the line can be “discerned with rea-
sonable certainty and predictability.”
190
 
 
 184 See Tex. Digital Sys., Inc., 308 F.3d at 1204–05.  
 185 Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315. 
 186 Id. at 1323. 
 187 Wegner, supra note 21. 
 188 Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323. 
 189 Id. at 1323. 
 190 Id. 
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In practice it has proved very hard to distinguish between these 
two.  There appears to be an “inherent tension . . . as to whether a 
statement [in the specification] is a clear lexicographic definition or 
a description of a preferred embodiment.”
191
  This tension between 
“reading limitations from the specification into the claim” and inter-
preting claims “in view of the specification” is very closely related to 
the fight over the disclosure requirements between the one embodi-
ment rule and the rule limiting the claims to embodiments disclosed 
in the specification.
192
  As this Article emphasizes the correctness of 
the substantive view, it advocates for choosing the latter rule.  In oth-
er words, claims must be read in light of the specification, and the 
claims cannot validly extend to embodiments that were not disclosed 
in the specification.  As argued by Judge Lourie, in a concurrence 
joined by Judge Newman: “[C]laims need not necessarily be limited 
to specific or preferred embodiments in the specification, although 
they are limited to what is contained in the overall disclosure of the 
specification.”
193
  So far, patent law has yet to resolve this conflict. 
The problem is that Phillips did not reach the underlying issue of 
the invention.  In fact, whether intentional or not, Phillips walks a fine 
line that supports both visions of the invention.  It reiterates the “be-
drock principle” that “the claims of a patent define the invention.”
194
  
But as suggested earlier, this statement is ambiguous.  It has often 
been used to support the cult but it can also be reinterpreted to sup-
port the substantive vision.
195
  Indeed, directly following that state-
ment, Phillips follows with a statement that supports either view.  It 
provides some support for the substantive view by stating that “we 
look to the words of the claims themselves . . . to define the scope of 
the patented invention.”
196
  But it immediately follows with a clear 
 
 191 E-Pass Techs., Inc. v. 3COM Corp., 343 F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see 
also LG Elecs., Inc. v. Bizcom Elecs., Inc., 453 F.3d 1364, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2006), rev’d 
on other grounds sub nom. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 
(2008); Chiang, supra note 23, at 13; Joseph Scott Miller, Enhancing Patent Disclosure 
for Faithful Claim Construction, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 177, 205 (2005); Robert Unikel 
& Douglas Eveleigh, Protecting Inventors, Not Fortune Tellers: The Available Patent Protec-
tion for After-Developed Technologies, 34 AIPLA Q.J. 81, 88 n.9 (2006) (“How one can 
read claims ‘in light of the specification’ but yet avoid importing limitations from the 
specification has never been adequately explained, perhaps because these ostensibly 
contradictory tenets of claim construction cannot be reconciled.”). 
 192 See also Cotropia, supra note 12, at 17–18 (arguing that the disclosure debate 
and the claim construction debate are closely linked). 
 193 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1328–29 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
 194 Id. at 1312. 
 195 See supra Part III. D. 
 196 Phillips, 415 F.3d. at 1312. 
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nod to the cult: “The written description part of the specification it-
self does not delimit the right to exclude.  That is the function and 
purpose of the claims.”
197
  In short, this Article argues that, just as with 
the disclosure requirements, claim interpretation remains an unack-
nowledged mix of both a trivial and a substantive vision of the inven-
tion.  It  has yet to squarely face and decide this critically important 
issue.
198
 
Patent law should discuss and then adopt the substantive vision 
of the invention.  Though Phillips describes the sources that can be 
consulted during claim interpretation, it does not tell us what claims 
are.  In the cult’s view, they are just the exclusive rights granted by a 
patent.  That definition gives very few contextual clues as to the dis-
tinction between correct and incorrect interpretations.  Full adoption 
of the substantive view adds meaning because it tells us why the 
claims were written.  The claims were written to circumscribe differ-
ing parts of the invention disclosed in the specification.  This tells us 
what claims are and tells us thus how to interpret them. 
In the modern cult-influenced patent system, the claims have no 
conceptual meaning outside of their definition of the exclusive 
rights.  In the cult’s eyes, the claims were written by the applicant only 
for the purpose of defining their rights to exclude.  In later construc-
tion of those words, there is little that helps to tell a judge where pre-
cisely to draw the line.  It is not surprising then that “courts define 
the scope of legal rights not by reference to the invention but by ref-
erence to semantic debates over the meaning of words chosen by law-
yers.”
199
 
By emptying the invention of any substantive content, modern 
patent law has removed meaning from the claims.  Claim interpreta-
tion is now a meaningless exercise.  Interpretation in modern patent 
law takes the actual words from claim language and replaces them 
with more words.
200
  Phillips did give a methodology for claim con-
struction.  We know what sources to consult, but in a fundamental 
sense we still do not know what we are doing.  We know that claims 
matter but we do not know what they represent.  We still do not have 
a coherent picture of what the claims represent because in the for-
malist modern view claims do not represent anything but their func-
tion as boundaries for exclusion.
201
  In a recent article, Mark Lemley 
 
 197 Id. 
 198 See Cotropia, supra note 12, at 52. 
 199 Burk & Lemley, supra note 177, at 1746. 
 200 See id. 
 201 See MUELLER, supra note 24, at 69–70. 
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and Dan Burk suggest that patent law should stop “relying on the illu-
sion of peripheral [claiming]” and its promise of uniformity and cer-
tainty.
202
  Their concern with the present system is that 
we’re not often litigating what the inventor did or what her patent 
should cover, because we are too concerned with what the lawyers 
did to define what the invention should cover.  We have, in other 
words, taken our eyes off of the ball. 
     The shift in focus from the invention to the claim language al-
lows both sides to game the process.  It permits—and indeed even 
encourages—over claiming by patentees, particularly patentees 
drafting or interpreting claims years after the invention itself.  If 
the focus is on the language of my claims, not the product that I 
actually built or described, I can interpret that language creatively 
to claim, in retrospect, to own inventions that I didn’t have in 
mind when I wrote the patent claims.
203
 
Based on these concerns, they advocate a return to central 
claiming
204
 and its reliance on the specification for its description of 
the invention.
205
  They argue that such a move “will help refocus pa-
tent analysis on inventions and not linguistic games.”
206
  They temper 
their policy proscriptions by acknowledging that “dethroning the 
centrality of the [peripheral] patent claim would require some signif-
icant changes to the way the current patent system operates.”
207
 
I strongly agree with their emphasis on the invention, and yet I 
do not think that it necessarily requires any significant statutory 
reform.  In fact, as argued above, the proper interpretation of our 
current patent system is a system in which the invention is the central 
concept even if we still use peripheral claims as administrative tools.  
In this view claims do not directly define the exclusive boundaries of 
the patent.  Instead, claims represent the invention, the thing con-
ceived by the inventor and disclosed in the specification.  And be-
cause they represent the invention, the claims can be used to fulfill 
patent law’s statutory command to grant exclusive rights in the “pa-
tented invention.”  By representing a thing, despite the fact that the 
thing is abstract, claims are given meaning and stability.
208
  By linking 
 
 202 Burk & Lemley, supra note 177, at 1747. 
 203 Id. at 1762. 
 204 Id. at 1799. 
 205 Id. at 1747. 
 206 Id. at 1796. 
 207 Id. at 1783. 
 208 See Netword, LLC v. Centraal Corp., 242 F.3d 1347, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2001) 
(“The claims are directed to the invention that is described in the specification; they 
do not have meaning removed from the context from which they arose.”). 
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claim interpretation so closely to the invention described in the speci-
fication, many of the central claiming advantages advocated by Burk 
and Lemley should appear in our already existing  peripheral claim-
ing system.  The key is to openly recognize the invention as a substan-
tive concept.
209
 
In the substantive view, the claims are proxies for the invention 
and the specification ensures the fidelity of that relationship.  This 
aids claim interpretation.  Once a patent application complies with 
that requirement, then indeed patent law can reference the claims 
rather than referencing the invention.  For example, after complying 
with § 112 ¶ 1, though novelty asks whether “the invention was known 
or used before,”
210
  or, after passage of the Leahy-Smith America In-
vents Act, whether “the claimed invention was . . . in public use . . .  
before,”211 patent law can replace the invention or the claimed inven-
tion with the claimed subject matter.  Similarly and perhaps most im-
portantly for public notice reasons, the patent system can also confi-
dently replace the “patented invention” in the infringement context 
with “the claimed subject matter.”  In short, the disclosure require-
ments of § 112 ¶ 1 ensure that the claims are accurate proxies for the 
invention while the indefiniteness requirement housed in § 112 ¶ 2 
ensures that they are precise proxies. 
Claims can and do play a central role in this system.  But they are 
important not because the claims are the invention but rather be-
cause the claims are proxies for the invention.  In other words, the 
invention is the central focus and the claims are administrative tools 
that help administer the patent statute.
212
  And for that administrative 
proxy relationship to work, patent law must keep some conceptual 
distance between the claims and the invention.  The law uses such 
proxies in many places.  In agency, the purpose of the principal agent 
relationship is to allow the principal to delegate decision making to 
an agent.
213
  The agent acts as a proxy for the principal.  Similarly, in 
contracts, the central issue is the agreement between the parties.  Of-
ten the parties memorialize that agreement in writing, and that writ-
 
 209 See Chiang, supra note 23, at 9 (“Assuming that the claims and the specification 
describe the same thing, just in different ways, makes claim interpretation easier.”). 
 210 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006). 
 211  See Pub. L. No. 112-29; 125 Stat. 284 (2011). 
 212 See Lutz, supra note 18, at 470. 
 213 See, e.g., MARK LEE LEVINE, BUSINESS AND THE LAW 230 (1976)(noting the need 
for the agent to be loyal and obedient to the interests of the principal).    
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ten document then serves as an objective proxy for the more abstract 
agreement.
214
 
Both agency law and contract law benefit from using a proxy.  
Rather than bothering the principal for every decision or rather than 
needing to plumb the perhaps subjective recollections of a contrac-
tual agreement, we can instead rely on the agent or the written doc-
ument respectively.  As part of such a system, both agency law and 
contract law keep the principal conceptually separate from its proxy 
even though in day-to-day operation we might conflate the two.  For 
example, even though in lazier moments we might say that the writ-
ten document is the agreement, and we might even note that in most 
circumstances the written document itself can answer most major 
questions about the agreement, the agreement and the written doc-
ument are conceptually kept apart.  The reason for this separation is 
simple.  For a proxy system to work, the law must maintain some 
skepticism (rebuttable though it may be) that monitors that the 
proxy properly serves as a proxy. 
Exactly along these lines, the substantive invention uses claims as 
proxies for the invention.
215
  When the claims precisely and accurately 
reflect the invention, the claims can then be efficiently referenced ra-
ther than requiring a direct reference to the invention.  Yet just as 
with contract and agency, patent law needs to keep the invention 
conceptually separate from the claims.  And the patent statute needs 
to enforce that proxy relationship.  Like the duty of loyalty in agency 
or like the suspicion with which judges approach purported integra-
tion clauses in contract law, patent law imposes a duty of fidelity on 
the claims so that they function as proxies for the invention.  As 
noted in Phillips, “The claims, of course, do not stand alone.  Rather, 
they are part of ‘a fully integrated written instrument.’”
216
 
 In the patent statute, §§ 112 ¶¶ 1–2 perform this critical func-
tion of certifying the proxy relationship.  They require the patentees 
to prove that they have indeed invented the subject matter that they 
claim to have invented.  In other words, the description must be de-
tailed enough so that the description itself can corroborate that the 
 
 214 See, e.g., id. at 189 (“[T]he written memorandum . . . will evidence a con-
tract.”). 
 215 See James W. Dabney, KSR: It Was Not a Ghost, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & 
HIGH TECH. L.J. 131, 144 n.69 (2007). 
 216 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (quot-
ing Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 978 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en 
banc)); see also Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 389 (1996) 
(‘‘[A claim] term can be defined only in a way that comports with the instrument as 
a whole.’’). 
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inventor indeed invented (meaning conceived and reduced to prac-
tice) the claimed subject matter.  And the claims are written to cir-
cumscribe varying sets of these disclosed embodiments.  “The patent 
system is based on the proposition that claims cover only the invented 
subject matter.”
217
  As stated by the Supreme Court, “‘[I]t seems to us 
that nothing can be more just and fair, both to the patentee and the 
public, than that the former should understand, and correctly de-
scribe, just what he has invented, and for what he claims a patent.’”
218
 
This purpose then becomes very important in later interpreting 
the claim language.  “[I]t is fundamental that claims are to be con-
strued in the light of the specifications and both are to be read with a 
view to ascertaining the invention.”
219
  That purpose gives contextual 
meaning to the interpretive process.  Knowing why claims were writ-
ten is essential in properly interpreting them later.  That understand-
ing gives previous statements about claim interpretation greater im-
port.  For example, Phillips held that “[i]mportantly, the person of 
ordinary skill in the art is deemed to read the claim term not only in 
the context of the particular claim in which the disputed term ap-
pears, but in the context of the entire patent, including the specifica-
tion.”
220
  This should not be read as simply asking a person of skill to 
read the specification and then define some disputed claim terms 
based on her understanding of the term.  Rather, the person of skill 
needs to read the specification and the claim and then interpret the 
claim language to determine what set of embodiments disclosed in 
the specification the applicant intended to circumscribe with that 
particular claim.  This notion was best described in Renishaw and was 
later cited in Phillips: “[T]he interpretation to be given a term can on-
ly be determined and confirmed with a full understanding of what 
the inventors actually invented and intended to envelop with the 
claim.”
221
 
V. SUBSTANTIVE INVENTION AS COLLATERAL DAMAGE 
In light of this large misstep that has befallen modern patent 
law, the question immediately arises: How could patent law have tak-
en such a fundamental wrong turn?  This Part provides some histori-
 
 217 Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1321.  
 218 Id. (quoting Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 573–74 (1876)). 
 219 United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 49 (1966); see also Phillips, 415 F.3d at 
1316. 
 220 Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313 (quoting Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Ari-
zona, 158 F.3d 1243, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). 
 221 Id. at 1316. 
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cal context and argues that it is not just that we have forgotten about 
the invention; rather, it was actively purged from our thinking be-
cause of mistaken identity. 
Up until the 1950s the term invention was being used in very 
confusing ways.  The invention “came to be used to refer to the thing 
invented and also to some vague quality necessary to patentability.”
222
  
Patent law was structured so that an “invention (in the concrete 
sense) [might be found] unpatentable because it is not an invention 
(in the abstract sense).”
223
  These usages were confusing and were 
leading to “muddy thought.”
224
  At the time the 1952 Patent Act was 
drafted, one usage of the term “invention” had indeed become very 
problematic.  This was the court-created “requirement of ‘inven-
tion.’”
225
 
The patent lawyers of the era “meekly accepted it as an article of 
faith—with plenty of experience to back it up—that ‘invention,’ [re-
ferring to the requirement of invention] indeed could not be de-
fined.”
226
  The “requirement of invention” was “that ‘beautiful uncer-
tainty in the law’ from which the patent bar made its living—
practicing what was essentially a mystery.”
227
  Judge Learned Hand 
commented that “[the requirement of invention] is as fugitive, im-
palpable, wayward, and vague a phantom as exists in the whole para-
phernalia of legal concepts.”
228
  The situation soon worsened to the 
point that the confusion became unacceptable.  Senate reports iden-
tified “the greatest technical weakness of the patent system . . . [as] 
the lack of a definitive yardstick as to what is invention.”
229
  Congress 
responded and recruited then-patent attorney Giles Rich, among 
others, to help draft the 1952 Patent Act.
230
 
The drafters of the 1952 Act, recognizing the troubles with the 
“requirement of invention,” did not incorporate that requirement in-
to the codification.  The drafters ultimately decided to “‘get away 
 
 222 Giles S. Rich, Principles of Patentability, in NONOBVIOUSNESS, supra note 19, at 2:1, 
2:9. 
 223 Giles S. Rich, The Vague Concept of “Invention” as Replaced by § 103 of the 1952 Pa-
tent Act, 14 FED. CIR. B.J. 147, 162 (2004). 
 224 Id. 
 225 Giles S. Rich, Why and How Section 103 Came to Be, in NONOBVIOUSNESS, supra 
note 19, at 1:201, 1:201. 
 226 Id. at 1:208. 
 227 Id. at 1:205. 
 228 Harries v. Air King Prods. Co., Inc., 183 F.2d 158, 162 (2d Cir. 1950). 
 229 Rich, supra note 225, at 1:207. 
 230 Giles S. Rich, Congressional Intent—Or, Who Wrote the Patent Act of 1952, in 
NONOBVIOUSNESS, supra note 19, at 1:1, 1:1. 
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from this troublesome term altogether’ . . . .  ‘Let’s not use [the term 
invention] at all and say what we really mean, and speak in terms of a 
requirement for patentability.’”
231
  From that, the now familiar re-
quirement of obviousness was codified in 35 U.S.C. § 103.  It avoided 
all reference to the requirement of invention.
232
  The drafters’ entire 
focus was the one troublesome usage and it was excised from the sta-
tute.  I have no quibble with that change.
233
 
Unfortunately, despite its replacement in the new statute, patent 
law only slowly started to reflect the change.
234
  Courts continued to 
refer to the requirement of invention rather than the newly minted 
statutory requirement of obviousness.  A struggle ensued between 
those that were following the new statute and those that stubbornly 
held onto the older terminology, most notably members of the Su-
preme Court.
235
 
The drafters of the new act undertook a rhetorical campaign to 
reeducate patent lawyers and judges and to purge the requirement of 
invention from the patent lexicon.  Judge Giles Rich, one of the 
founders of modern patent law, metaphorically “open[ed] [a discus-
sion of modern patent law] with prayers and a burnt offering [of] all 
of the textbooks on patent law which talk about the requirement of 
‘invention.’”
236
  In large part the purge was successful;
237
 patent law-
 
 231 Rich, supra note 225, at 1:209.  
 232 Actually, it does use the invention, but as this Article makes clear, it is used in 
its concrete sense, the sense that was not problematic. 
 233 The change was certainly a statutory and rhetorical change.  What remains 
controversial is whether the change was also a substantive change or whether it kept 
the level of patentability the same but only changed the way in which we discuss that 
level. 
 234 Giles S. Rich, Laying the Ghost of the “Invention Requirement,” in NONOBVIOUSNESS, 
supra 19, at 1:501, 1:511 (“[F]or the first few years [after 1952] courts were not 
heeding the statute.”).   
 235 Id. at 1:515–16.  See also Herbert Mintz & Charles O’Rourke, After Black Rock: 
New Tests of Patentability—The Old Tests of Invention, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 123, 123 
(1970)(“In Anderson’s-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co. the Supreme Court 
revived the illusory ‘invention’ standard as a requisite of patent validity.  In light of its 
apparent rejection by Congress and subsequent abandonment by the Court [in 
Graham v. John Deere], the reappearance of this standard in Black Rock raises, 
questions of vital concern to proponents of a functional patent system.”). 
 236 Rich, supra note 225, at 1:201.  Indeed, at the time the 1952 Patent Act was be-
ing drafted, Giles Rich had a good reason to worry about how invention was being 
misused in patent law.  See infra note 27–32 and accompanying text (discussing the 
problems with the requirement of invention and how the usage of the invention in any 
form was purged as a result). 
 237 The controversy surrounding obviousness that ultimately lead to the KSR, In-
ternational, Co. v. Teleflex case can be seen in part as a remnant of that battle between 
the new statutory standard of obviousness and the older requirement of invention, 
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yers now rightfully talk about obviousness rather than the require-
ment of invention. 
But as with any zealous purge, things often go astray; there is col-
lateral damage.  In this case, the concrete use of “the invention,” re-
ferring to the subject matter conceived by the inventor, was purged 
along with the problematic “requirement of invention.”  In modern 
patent law, the prohibition on uttering “the invention” has been too 
successful; Judge Rich’s prayers have come true.
238
  No modern patent 
textbook explores any substantive definition of the invention.  The 
patent bar has been taught to avoid using the term invention in any 
substantive form; it is a relic from an older, subjective, and likely dys-
functional patent system. 
For example, during the relatively recent oral arguments in KSR 
International, Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.,239 Justice Stevens was exploring the 
details of the solution offered by the patentee.  This is the exact place 
where it is helpful and correct to ask about the invention, the thing 
conceived by the inventor.  Justice Stevens, however, asked whether 
“[t]he invention, to use an old-fashioned term, is the decision of 
where to put the control”?
240
  Even here, where Justice Stevens was 
asking about the details of the concrete solution described in the pa-
tent, he felt some discomfort in using the term “invention” despite 
the fact that it appears 250 times in the statute.  We have been taught 
that invention is not the right way for the initiated to discuss patent 
law.  The concrete usage of the invention, referring to the thing ac-
tually invented, has fallen victim to modern patent law’s cult of the 
claim.  And as relayed in this Article, patent law is currently suffering 
from its inability to use this important term properly.  The time has 
come to begin using the term invention in the substantive way in 
which the statute demands. 
VI. FURTHER IMPLICATIONS OF SUBSTANTIVE INVENTION 
In addition to the benefits already described, there are other 
areas in which the substantive vision of the invention will have an im-
pact on patent law and theory.  This Part sketches three of these 
areas. 
 
especially as a fight between how the two tests compare to each other.  See Dabney, 
supra note 215, at 146. 
 238 See supra note 232 and accompanying text.  
 239  550 U.S. 398 (2007). 
 240 Transcript of Oral Argument at 55, KSR Int’l, Co., v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 
398 (No. 04-1350); see also Dabney, supra note 215, at 147. 
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A. Inventing the Future Before It Arrives 
Closely related to both the disclosure requirements and claim in-
terpretation, there is presently conceptual and doctrinal confusion 
surrounding claim scope and its relation to after-arising technology.
241
  
Imagine inventing the chair and disclosing how to make a chair out 
of wood.  You are granted a patent over this.  Imagine that soon the-
reafter carbon fiber is invented and someone starts manufacturing 
chairs not from wood but instead built from carbon fiber.  Should 
that carbon fiber chair infringe the earlier patent?  Equivalently, if 
the claim can literally be interpreted to include such a chair, how 
could such a claim be valid under § 112, and, more generally, how 
could a patentee enable a person of skill to make and use carbon fi-
ber before it has been invented (whether for chair building or not)? 
These are the types of questions that surround the issue of pa-
tents and after-arising technology.  Scholars are divided.
242
  Some have 
solved this “temporal paradox” by arguing that enablement requires 
the claim to be enabled as of its filing date while infringement is 
measured at the time of infringement.
243
  Thus, a broad claim will be 
valid if it enables the claimed subject matter as “it was understood at 
the filing date,” and yet it can still “cover” all variants covered by 
claim (even later developed ones) interpreted as of the date of in-
fringement.
244
  Other scholars disagree, arguing that claim language 
for validity and infringement should be interpreted consistently and 
therefore the courts should use one single temporal frame of refer-
ence.
245
 As a result, the idea that claims could expand later would 
have to be rejected.
246
 
Similarly, the issue is not settled in the courts.  They have held 
that it is an error to require a patentee to “enable nonexistent tech-
 
 241 See Cotropia, supra note 12, at 540 (“An ‘after-arising’ technology is a technol-
ogy that ‘come[s] into existence after the filing date of a[] [patent] application.’” 
(quoting In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 605 (C.C.P.A 1977))). 
 242 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 178, at 1764; Kevin Emerson Collins, Enabling 
After-Arising Technology, 34 J. CORP L. 1083 (2009); Cotropia, supra note 12, at 540; 
Feldman, supra note 161, at 3 (“Modern case law reflects confusion over whether the 
footprint of an invention includes things unknown at the time of the invention.”); 
Lefstin, supra note 10, at 1156.  
 243 See MERGES, supra note 90, at 299–300 (describing this as the “temporal para-
dox”). 
 244 Id. 
 245 See Mark A. Lemley, The Changing Meaning of Patent Claim Terms, 104 MICH. L. 
REV. 101, 120 (2005). 
 246 Id.  
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nology”
247
 as that would “impose an impossible burden on inventors 
and thus on the patent system.”
248
  But it is less clear whether such 
claims can later be interpreted more broadly for infringement pur-
poses.  In Chiron, the Federal Circuit did not have to reach the issue 
as the invalidity of the claims was affirmed, but the court acknowl-
edged “a dilemma” whether that claim should be interpreted “ac-
cording to meaning [of the disclosure]” or whether to “construe the 
term [according to the later meaning that is] broader than the dis-
closure.”
249
  At least one judge made it clear that he would not later 
interpret the claim more broadly.  The “proper approach . . . is [to] 
constru[e] claims . . . as they would have been understood by one of 
skill in the art at the time of the invention, and not [to]construe 
them to reach the as-yet-undeveloped technology that the applicant 
did not enable.”
250
 
These challenging issues can be nicely solved by turning to the 
substantive vision of the invention.  Many might wrongly assume that 
the substantive notion of the invention necessarily leads to narrow 
claim scope.  But in fact, the substantive vision can support broad 
claims.  Broad claims are allowed where the patentee discloses and 
claims a broad conception.  This can be done rather easily where a 
patentee understands the principle behind the invention.  Knowing 
how and why one solution to some problem works often allows the 
inventor to conceive and disclose other embodiments that will simi-
larly work.  Not only does this allow for a broad disclosure of present-
ly existing embodiments, but it also can in many cases allow for dis-
closure of embodiments that use components that do not yet exist.
251
  
Disclosure of the principle of the invention has been part of patent 
law for a long time.
252
 
 
 247 Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2004).  Note 
that the invalidity of the non-original claim in Chiron was supported by the failure to 
comply with the written description requirement.  
 248 In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 606 (C.C.P.A. 1977); see also Chiron, 363 F.3d at 1254 
(“[A] patent document cannot enable technology that arises after the date of appli-
cation.  The law does not expect an applicant to disclose knowledge invented or de-
veloped after the filing date.”). 
 249 Chiron, 363 F.3d at 1258. 
 250 Id.  at 1263 (Bryson, J., concurring). 
 251 See Lefstin, supra note 10, at 1122 n.259; Lutz, supra note 18, at 465; Michael J. 
Meurer & Craig Allen Nard, Invention, Refinement and Patent Claim Scope: A New Pers-
pective on the Doctrine of Equivalents, 93 GEO. L.J. 1947, 1961–66 (2005).  
 252 See Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 418–19 (1908) (fo-
cusing on the principle of the invention, not a specific embodiment); Winans v. 
Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 343 (1853) (focusing on the “substance of the in-
vention”); see also Chiang, supra note 23, at 3; Lutz, supra note 18, at 460. 
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For example, suppose I disclose a chair made from wood and I 
also disclose the basic engineering principles that make the chair 
work and I make it clear that it need not be made from wood; then 
this lays the groundwork for literal claims that could be applied to 
chairs made from after-arising materials.  Suppose I explain that the 
four legs need to be made from a material such that each leg can 
support one quarter of the weight of a human plus some margin of 
safety.  At some later date, after carbon fiber and polymer resin com-
posites have been invented, persons of skill in furniture making will 
read my specification and they will be able to build a carbon fiber 
chair not because they could make and use it after reading my specification 
but because they would do so—the specification would tell them to use 
materials other than wood as long as those materials met the mechan-
ical properties outlined by the specification.  Such a broad concep-
tion demonstrates what I call a trans-technological invention.  It can 
cover embodiments that were not explicitly foreseen but that were 
nonetheless explicitly taught by the specification. 
By understanding their invention at a trans-technological level, a 
patentee can describe these solutions in rather abstract but still speci-
fied terms.  As it relates to after-arising components, this broad un-
derstanding of the underlying principles allow that patentee to com-
municate to future persons of skill in the art.  If and when such 
disclosures are made, patent claims could well cover embodiments 
that use components that did not exist at the time the patent was 
filed. 
In addition to addressing after-arising technology, the substan-
tive invention also addresses confusion over the correct time frame 
for interpreting claim language.  Claims are interpreted as of the fil-
ing date but they are construed as of the date of infringement.  This 
allows validity to be judged at filing, but it allows the set of embodi-
ment to grow if indeed the patentee managed to disclose and claim 
such a trans-technological invention.  Interestingly, a corollary to this 
discussion is that substantive vision would not permit the “classic” 
blocking patent scenario.  Claims could only cover embodiments that 
the specification teaches.  This necessarily means that claimed embo-
diments are obvious and not patentable by later patenteess.
253
  This 
prevents the classic improvement-blocking patent.  Blocking patents 
 
 253 See Charles W. Adams, Allocating Patent Rights Between Earlier and Later Inventions, 
54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 55 (2010) (making similar arguments based on the full-scope 
enablement cases coupled to nonobviousness). 
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could still occur but in limited circumstances.  For example, they 
could still emerge for component-style-blocking patents.
254
 
B. Finding Invention 
Having just sketched how the substantive vision of the invention 
can provide patent claims that encompass after-arising technology, it 
should be emphasized that not all inventions can be claimed as 
broadly.  Not all inventions are created the same.  Some classes of in-
vention are necessarily much narrower.  Further exploration of the 
invention reveals a spectrum between high and low inventorship akin 
to the distinction between high and low authorship in copyright. 
From a distance, much of copyrightable subject matter looks the 
same—from a distance all “writings” look similar.  From a distance, it 
is hard to tell whether a book on a shelf is a novel or a laborious list-
ing of scientific facts.  On closer inspection, however, the average 
person, and indeed copyright, treat a novel quite differently from a 
phone directory.  Copyright affords one, the novel, a relatively broad 
copyright, while it affords the other, the directory, a very narrow one.  
As summarized by Jane Ginsburg, 
We have now, as we have long had, two kinds of copyrights: in 
high authorship works, such as novels and narrative histories, 
copyright protects the authorial presence within the work; in low 
authorship works, such as telephone directories and compilations 
of stock quotations, copyright protects the labor and resources in-
vested in the work’s creation.
255
   
Importantly, the monikers “high” and “low” authorship and their 
concomitant scope of copyright are not attempts to denigrate the so-
cial value of fact intensive works.  Undoubtedly, on any stormy night a 
navigator would surely trade the best novel in the world for an accu-
rate chart.  Nonetheless the scope of low authorship works is much 
smaller than high authorship works. 
Akin to these low authorship works in copyright, some inven-
tions are just not as broad as others.  Much of biotechnology still 
finds incredibly important solutions by trial and error (albeit via clev-
er and sophisticated trial and error screening techniques).256 This will 
 
 254 See Kevin E. Collins, Getting into the Spirit of Innovative Things: Looking to Substi-
tute and Complimentary Properties to Shape Patent Protection for Improvements, 26 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1217 (2011) (highlighting these “easy” cases of component blocking pa-
tents (internal quotation marks omitted)).   
 255 Jane Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of Works of In-
formation, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1865, 1870 (1990). 
 256 See BRUCE ALBERTS ET AL., MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF  THE CELL 187–88 (3d ed. 
1994). 
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likely impact many very important areas of biotechnology including 
gene patents, cell lines, and monoclonal antibody patents.257
 
 
These are areas where patent claims today are quite broad com-
pared to the actual invention.  In most cases, one actual embodiment 
is disclosed often by way of biological deposit, but the claims cover far 
more than the one deposited embodiment.  In the cult’s view of the 
patent system, this does not pose any real problem, but it creates real 
problems in the eyes of the substantive invention.  The real question 
in these cases is whether the patentee has actually invented any more 
than the one deposited embodiment.  Generally there is nothing in 
the specification that evidences conception of anything beyond the 
one deposited embodiment.  That disparity between the one solution 
disclosed and the solutions claimed is why these inventions should be 
viewed as identical to the over-reaching patentees in The Incandescent 
Lamp Case.258  Where a solution to a technical problem is found 
through trial and error (even sophisticated, elegant trial and error 
like in the case of antibodies) without further discovering how to 
extrapolate to other solutions from the one found solution, claims 
cannot exceed that one particular solution.
259
  Finding invention 
without more is the quintessential act of low inventorship and the re-
sulting patent cannot have broad claims. 
C. Patent Theory: Focus on Inventions, Not Legally Created Incentives 
In addition to the many doctrinal and practical changes, the 
substantive vision of the invention leads to a serious rethinking of 
fundamental patent theory.  There are many theories of the patent 
system.  They differ in detail yet they all share one common assump-
tion.  Though a free market works well with tangible goods, it is 
thought that it is ill-suited for inventions as the copying inherent in a 
competitive market makes it impossible to recover the often large 
fixed costs of creating the inventions. The patent system therefore is 
seen as an exception to a competitive market.  In particular, patents 
are designed to artificially interfere with the market to create incen-
tives. 
Patent claims are seen as this incentive and the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office and the courts are therefore seen as balancing the 
incentives created by a patent’s exclusive rights against its costs.  The 
trouble is that no one knows how to quantify these costs or benefits 
 
 257  See Liivak, supra note 71, at 3. 
 258 Consol. Elec. Light Co. v. McKeesport Light Co. (The Incandescent Lamp 
Case), 159 U.S. 465 (1895). 
 259 See id. at 472. 
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and despite two hundred years of heated debate, we still cannot con-
clude if, on balance, our patent system is worth it.  Instead, support 
for, or criticism of, the patent system has been based ultimately on 
belief.  Patent debates have pitted “[c]onviction . . . against convic-
tion, argument against argument, assumption against assumption.”
260
  
Judge Learned Hand testified before the Senate that 
[t]here are two schools and the one school beats the air and says 
without the patent system the whole of American industry would 
never have been developed.  [The patent system] is the stimulus 
which has brought us to the top, and the other says it is nothing 
but a beastly method . . . .  No one really knows.  Each side is beat-
ing the air.  They approach it with enormous passion but without 
enlightenment.
261
 
Over fifty years ago, the Senate, worried about this issue, asked econ-
omist Fritz Machlup to resolve this empirical cost-benefit question.  
After an extensive ninety page report weighing the evidence, he gave 
the following dispiriting conclusion: 
If we did not have a patent system, it would be irresponsible, on 
the basis of our present knowledge of its economic consequences, 
to recommend instituting [it].  But since we have had [one] for a 
long time, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present 
knowledge, to recommend abolishing it.
262
 
Perhaps we have made the problem too complicated.  As suggested 
by the doctrinal focus on the invention, perhaps patent law and pa-
tent theory should not be about legally created incentives at all but 
should be instead about exclusivity over the invention alone. 
Patent law should be viewed as part of the legal infrastructure for 
an institution that enables inventors to create and sell inventions.
263
  
We need not ask how much legally created incentive some inventor 
needs.  Instead, we presume that useful inventions have their own in-
herent economic incentives—if the invention is useful, people will 
want to buy it.  The purpose of the patent system is not to provide in-
centives, but rather, to prevent the third party acts that would prevent 
 
 260 Fritz Machlup & Edith Penrose, The Patent Controversy in the Nineteenth Century, 
10 J. ECON. HIST. 1, 28 (1950). 
 261 The American Patent System: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, 
and Copyrights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 84th Cong. 116 (1956) (statement of 
Judge Learned Hand). 
 262 FRITZ MACHLUP, AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM, SUBCOMM. ON 
PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY 80 
(1958).   
 263 This also includes business models that aim to create inventions and sell prod-
ucts or services that embody the inventions. 
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inventors from benefiting from the already existing economic incen-
tives.  Congress has already decided how much protection is needed 
to allow for those economic incentives to flow to the inventor.  By 
granting the exclusive rights over the patentable invention, Congress 
has created a property system.  Property, as stated by Bentham, does 
not “reward,” rather, it “preserves” “recompense” by “arresting the 
hand that may seek to ravish . . . from you.”
264
  Compared to the in-
centive-based theories and their impossible task of balancing incen-
tives against costs, this simplified invention theory paints a very im-
portant yet narrower and more manageable role for the patent 
system. 
VII.    CONCLUSION 
Modern patent law does not think much about the invention.  
The term surely gets used, but it is currently just a shorthand refer-
ence for the claimed subject matter.  The patent system that has 
emerged from that trivial vision of the invention is failing to provide 
its promise of precision and accuracy.  The problem is the trivial vi-
sion of the invention. 
By seeing the invention as a substantive concept, the patent sys-
tem can improve completeness, accuracy, and precision.  The inven-
tion is the set of embodiments conceived, disclosed, and claimed by 
the inventor.  With that substantive vision, we once again put the in-
vention at the center of patent law and the claims are viewed as im-
portant yet administrative tools for securing exclusive rights in the in-
vention.  That vision leads to a disclosure requirement that aims to 
evidence what was in fact invented.  It gives claims meaning and gives 
judges context to interpret claims.  Lastly, it necessarily limits patent 
claims to the substantive invention created by the inventor. 
 
 
 264 JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 110 (C.K. Ogden ed., Harcourt, 
Brace & Co. 1931)(1802). 
